

THE AMERICAN CATHOLIC QUARTERLY REVIEW

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(Extract from Salutory, July, 1890.)

VOL. XLVII.—APRIL, 1922—NO. 186

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PRACTICAL GODLESSNESS

I

ONE has but to make a brief survey of the manifold individual and collective activities of the present generation—activities industrial and commercial, social, political and legislative, national and international, literary and artistic, educational and scientific—to realize how widespread and abysmal is the estrangement of mankind from God.

I. In practice if not in theory, in deed if not in word, the world today denies or questions the basic truth of God's supreme, universal and absolute dominion. As a necessary consequence, man has lost true self-knowledge; he has ignored his own nature; he has become totally oblivious of the fundamental fact that he is a creature of whose very essence it is to be utterly and absolutely dependent, in being and operation, on the Creator, and to acknowledge this dependence by knowledge, love and service. Instead, man has become egocentric—a law unto himself in conduct and belief.

The immediate occasion for the present paper was furnished by an article in "The Yale Review" for October, entitled "The Menace of the Sermon." Its author, Francis E. Clark, founder of the United Society of Christian Endeavor, seeks to account for the scant church attendance of today; he contends that "the root of the evil is . . . the worship of the sermon instead of the worship of God." Other parts of the Protestant service are only "preliminary to the sermon," which is the chief attraction; when this fails, the attendance dwindles. "Our non-conformist ancestors did us a disservice . . . by making their meeting houses as bare of holy symbolism as they could." "Theology has lost its grip . . . The sense of duty has become more tenuous."

The following pages propose to show that the reasons pointed out by the author for the evils he deplures, are themselves but the results of a more profound and far-reaching cause; that these same evils are but a phase of a widespread estrangement from God; that the root cause of the latter is the rejection of those means which, considering man's whole psychic content—the nature of his mental faculties—are not only the most congenial, but wholly indispensable for establishing and maintaining his relations with God.

This accounts for the attenuation or total absence—so glaringly evident—of the sense of duty and strict responsibility to an all-knowing and all-just Judge, of the fear of God, of the essential difference between right and wrong, of the sense of guilt and sinfulness, of belief in future reward and punishment. The Decalogue has been replaced by this “ethical” code of laconic brevity: “Don’t get caught—look to the outside of the cup—keep up respectability.”

. . . Hence the dishonest business man and financier; the inhuman capitalist; the shirking laborer; the super-machiavelian statesman and diplomat; the be-silkened and be-satined rottenness of “high society”; the successive polygamy of divorce; the murder of innocents; the mephitic practices of birth-control.

2. Certain manifestations of this alienation from God amount to what one may term “Theophobia”—not, of course, that fear of God which is the beginning of wisdom, but that which becomes a highway to moral and spiritual ruin. A unique shyness, an irritation and impatience, often intensified to a positive dislike and aversion—if not downright hatred,—such are some of the symptoms in evidence whenever the things of God are mentioned. Rights of every conceivable sort are discussed today, in season and out of season, with more or less sense and much non-sense, but dare to refer, ever so remotely, in certain circles—social, academic, political, diplomatic—to the rights of the Creator and the corresponding duties of the creature, and you run the risk of being suspected of eccentricity or imbecility. When, as sometimes happens, the name of God is invoked on some momentous public occasion, there is noticeable a certain patronizing condescension and smug self-complacency; the incident causes comment, as being something out of the ordinary—which it is.

As to contemporary speculative thought, God has become to it what, for all practical purposes, amounts to a mere impersonal abstraction; each succeeding “great and original thinker,” knocking down the idol of his predecessor, creates unto himself his own god, according to his own image and liking—especially the latter. For is thought not “free”? And a very Babel of “philosophical” systems is the result. Barring one or two exceptions, the “*Philosophia perennis*”—the Scholastic Philosophy—is either superficially known or superciliously ignored by the modern “*illuminati*.”

God, then, has been removed far, far away from the affairs of men, and His supremacy quietly ignored if not positively denied. It is a modern paganism we are witnessing, perhaps worse than its prototype, inasmuch as material “progress” has multiplied and diversified the ways and means for procuring pleasure and luxury; it is

decidedly more hypocritical, for it masks its degeneracy with the veneer of respectability and even presumes to call itself Christian! And who will dare say that the modern idolatry of wealth, honors, pleasure, on whose altars men are prepared to sacrifice everything, is not as real (if less crass) as that of the ancients? And the "Christian" nations? Are they not ready to make any sacrifice for national aggrandizement and commercial greed—euphemistically called "reasons of State"? Behold the harrowing spectacle of the Near East, where these nations calling themselves Christian, quietly witness the butchery of thousands of their fellow-Christians by the infidel Turk without a word of official protest.

Whence this deplorable alienation from God? Whence this deadening of private and public conscience? What is its root cause?

The modern, or we should say, the "modernistic" man, the hapless heir to the profound and far-reaching aberrations of his ancestors, is reaping the bitter though inevitable fruits of the seeds of error they have sown: his more remote forebears became *Church-less* by setting at naught the one true Church; their progeny, taking the next logical step, rejected the fundamental doctrine of Christianity—the Divinity of Christ—and found themselves *Christ-less*; continuing the fatal process, the succeeding generations became *God-less* by denying to God the supreme place and vital influence in the affairs of men; finally, the ultimate result was reached in the deification of the State and the glorification of the Ego. These the four main stages of the downward path—these the steps along the "*facilis descensus Avernii*."

We affirm then, that the source, the initial step, the root-cause of this frightful alienation from God, is to be found in the repudiation (in the 16th century) of those visible means which Incarnate Wisdom, knowing the profoundest needs of man's nature—"knowing what is in man"—had entrusted to His own visible Church as the helps most suitable, in fact, indispensable in man's present condition, for establishing his contact and maintaining his union with God, and as the best safeguards against the ever present dangers of estrangement from God. The "reformers" rejected these means and the unavoidable results followed.

We shall briefly substantiate this by considering these means from their *psychological side*: by showing that, aside from, and in addition to, their doctrinal content and supernatural character, they have a marvellous aptness and efficacy for raising man to the invisible by means of the visible, to the spiritual by means of the material, to the divine by means of the human—thus operating in a manner most consonant with man's faculties and with the entire economy

of the Incarnation—with its way of giving God to man and leading man to God.

Some preliminary remarks on the nature of man's psychic faculties are necessary.

II

1. Man, being a composite of matter and spirit, has, in his present state, for the proper and proportionate object of his intellectual knowledge, the essence of things material—the abstract universalized quiddities or essential notes of the material objects perceived by the senses, and represented by the imagination. All the "material" of his knowledge is supplied by the senses; from the visible, the audible, the tangible, etc., he rises, through the imagination-images, to the supersensible, intellectual concept. In the further use and development of this knowledge he ever leans on the material images—there is no such thing as strictly imageless thought. Moreover, he knows the substances of things (the noumena) only through their appearances, sensible properties and operations (phenomena).

From the above, one consequence follows, important in the present matter; man is more forcibly and vividly impressed by what he perceives directly and immediately, that is, by the whole concrete, palpable, living object than by abstract ideas and processes of reasoning; the former have a markedly stronger appeal to the average man than the latter; he feels more "at home" among individual material objects and grasps them with greater ease. He knows, for instance, and appreciates a beautiful object when he sees it, but finds great difficulty in defining beauty as such. For the same reason the living example of a man of noble character impresses him more deeply than abstract precepts and principles. Whatever, then, is capable of quickening the whole man—his senses, imagination, emotions, affections, conations—has immeasurably more power of motivating and impelling to action and achievement than what addresses itself to the intellect alone. We understand now why it is an *instinctive longing of man's nature to see the embodiment, the incarnation of his ideals in the visible and the material.*

Finally it should be noted that the moral, spiritual and divine is accessible to human knowledge only through analogy, comparison, negative, transcendence; though imperfect, this is true knowledge, but it calls for a higher mental equipment, for more training, time and effort.

2. How arduous man finds the task of rising to the regions of the supersensible and the spiritual! How alluring the attraction, how overwhelming the pull to the things of sense! To what extent

this drag to earth was brought about by "man's first disobedience" we are not here concerned to determine. We take man as we find him in history and experience. Witness the deep degradation of pagan ignorance, sensuality and idolatry; witness the carnality of the Jewish people and their repeated relapses into idolatrous worship. And today? Reference has already been made to the less gross perhaps, but equally real idolatry of our day. As to higher knowledge and longing for the things of the spirit, we have the despairing cry of God-estranged humanity: "Ignoramus et ignorabimus," we do not know and we cannot know anything about the supersensible; Empiricism and Agnosticism hold the fort. "O dark, dark, dark—amid the blaze of noon" is the pitiful wail of those who have strayed far from "the Way, the Truth, and the Life." And while some of them allow themselves to sink into the dark abyss of stark cynicism and the resignation of despair, the majority throw themselves into the whirl of gross pleasures and bacchanalian revels—"carpe diem," "eat, drink, and be merry—for tomorrow we die"—and paganism is with us again.

It is true the nobler minds of antiquity realized and keenly felt the awful degeneracy of the human race, but the subtlest speculations of the Hellenic mind did yield but lifeless abstractions and cold precepts and axioms,—both equally powerless to influence the lives of the mass of mankind and raise it from the depths of its degradation. They felt that this could be effected only by a visible, incarnate manifestation of divine Truth, Goodness and Beauty—and for this they yearned. The sublime ideal may have been glimpsed, but it was found impossible of realization—it was beyond man's power. And yet that ideal and the longing for it was proof positive that man was made from a divine pattern, and for a nobler and higher destiny which, of himself he could not fulfill. Would a God come to his assistance? Yes, for so it was written in the eternal decrees of infinite love, wisdom, and omnipotence.

3. When God decreed man's redemption He willed "a copious and superabundant redemption." In His infinite compassion for the needs and frailties of poor human nature, bruised and wounded by original sin,—by a divinely sublime condescension to man's manifold weaknesses, He would not only redeem him, but He would accomplish his regeneration in that most marvelous manner which would at the same time provide the means most appropriate and efficacious for leading and raising man through the visible to the knowledge, love and imitation of the Invisible Divinity "dwelling in light inaccessible." God becomes visible in human form: "through the mystery of the Word Incarnate a new light of God's brightness flashes

on the eyes of our mind": Divine Truth, Goodness, Beauty, Perfection become incarnate: Christ is God brought within Man's reach under a human expression, the Divine made human, to teach us how the human may be made divine: the Incarnation is the divine majesty shining through the veil of humanity: a perfect and yet an accessible model for man. By virtue of His beatific vision Christ sees the archetype of the perfect man in the Divine Mind, and He bodies it forth in His life and conduct for man's imitation. The yearning of the ages is realized and satisfied. Plato's ideal man had one radical defect—he was unreal. In Christ we have the Real Ideal, the desired of the nations, the most perfect pattern for all time and all men and all conditions of life, the source and expression of a new life.

Through His real and perfect human nature, hypostatically united to His Divine Person, Christ has a most captivating and compelling attractiveness for the whole man; His is no longer the mere *notional* address of abstract precept and principle to intellect alone; it is the *real*, intimate, magnetic appeal of Person to person, of Man to man—to the totality of his being—to his senses, imagination, affections, reason, will; a living, palpitating, sympathetic contact, throbbing with life, gripping man's entire personality because it is so divinely human and so humanly divine, ravishing the human heart with the fervent desire of loving and imitating this Elder Brother whose Heart yearns with a great yearning for the salvation of all. It is the intimately personal love for the Person of Christ that holds the secret and the source of all sanctity and perfection; this the seed which germinated the "unnumbered multitude" of Christian heroes—those "other Christs"—the Martyrs, Virgins, Confessors who are the glory of Christ's Spouse, the Church.

To know what God is like, man need no longer lose himself in laborious and barren speculations: Bethlehem, Nazareth, Calvary are magical names with power to thrill the deepest human depths, with language to tell the humblest of mankind more about God than the wisest sage ever knew or ever dreamed. In Christ the divine attributes have become living realities, and what the ancients could never fathom is now plain, namely, that "God is Love." All men without distinction can become ennobled and sanctified in the one God-Man, as brothers of Christ, as children of their heavenly Father, as co-heirs of life eternal.

How is this to be accomplished? How is each one to gather unto himself the precious and abundant fruits of the Incarnation and Redemption?

III.

1. There is "an exquisite logic, enchainment, and vital continuity in the Divine Economy." We find the same principle consistently at work in the bringing about of man's union with God; the spiritual is mated with and works in and through the material. As in the One Person of Jesus Christ the divine and the human were inseparably united, so, hereafter, "all His action, all His achievement, will be 'incarnational.'" God will work for man through man; spiritual results will not normally be brought about independently of matter. The Word Incarnate will continue to be "the Way, the Truth, and the Life" in and through His masterpiece, the visible *Church*, with her visible means of sanctification and salvation. Christ will associate men to Himself—Bishops and Priests—whom He calls to co-operate with Him, to whom He gives a divine work to do; and they can do it because in them and through them it is Himself who acts.

As a consequence, according to the present plan of Divine Providence, the supernatural union of man with God is normally to be effected, not in isolation, but, in harmony with man's composite and social nature, through solidarity, by incorporation into a supernatural society; each individual must become, in fact or by desire, a living member of a visible living organism, the Church, the mystical body of Christ. Hence a visible head of that body, divinely constituted to represent the Invisible Head, Christ; hence a visible, infallible teaching authority to preserve pure and intact the deposit of Faith; hence the visible Sacraments signifying and conferring invisible grace, ministering to man's spiritual needs at his birth, adolescence, maturity, death: in all this we see God operating in a manner most consonant with human nature: by the mating and the co-operation of the material and the spiritual, the human and the divine: through the visible to the Invisible.

In connection with this subject, Father Martindale, S. J., makes some apposite remarks: "The Sacraments, then, are not only a work of God, but reveal the method of His working, and teach us, by imitating it, to sacramentalize the world. We are taught to seek for the true meaning and value of all that is, not on its surface, but within. We must not fantastically 'allegorize' Nature, but we must expect to find God present and working in it. Hence joy, hence love, hence freedom in a world become God's robe; in all things we may reach Him; nothing must be scorned, for it clothes Him; nor shall we ever dare to disdain it, as being *but* His robe; for the robe is *His*. Thus the whole world finds meaning; and as no static vision merely of a Faith, but as co-operative and dynamic" ("God and the Supernatural," p. 304).

2. We wish to call special attention to a few of these wonderful means of God's wisdom and love. Pre-eminent as the way to union with God is the *Most Holy Eucharist* in its threefold state and function of the Real Presence, of Holy Communion, and of the Holy Sacrifice of the Mass. Here we have the living extension and vivid continuation of the Incarnation; here we have the sublime secret, the mighty power, the divine magic, the marvellous attraction, the very heart and center of our holy religion.

And first in the *Real Presence* we have Emmanuel, God with us, as really and as truly as He is in heaven at the right hand of His Father. "Lord, where dwellest Thou?" In every Tabernacle of every Catholic church, how lowly soever, throughout the whole wide world. It is true that God is everywhere. Still, the concept of omnipresence is a difficult one; the imagination is almost entirely helpless; it is mainly a matter for the intellect. But here man's sensitive faculties find some support. Here God is present in a very special manner, as the God-Man, appealing to all the faculties of our soul. Here, in this locality, in this church we can visit Him as we visit a bosom friend in his home, there to hold intimate converse. And while we kneel in soulful prayer under the sanctuary lamp, we almost feel the divine glow of the soothing inspiring, uplifting, fortifying Presence; for we know that there in that tabernacle, under those appearances, is present our very Lord and God, our Divine Friend, who understands us with the understanding of a divine love, whose Heart yearns to refresh and console, to advise and strengthen, all who approach Him with faith and confidence. It is true that not only His Divinity, as during His earthly sojourn, but His humanity likewise, is hidden beneath the veil of the appearances; but the eye of Faith pierces that veil, and beholds there the Divine Babe of Bethlehem, the Divine Youth and Man of Nazareth, the Divine Sufferer and Victim of Calvary the glorified Saviour in heaven.

Again, how divinely human and how humanly divine! Human thought is impotent to grasp, human language helpless to express, the depths of divine condescension, goodness and wisdom, as displayed in this Mystery of Love. With hearts overflowing with love and gratitude we can only pray with the Angelic Doctor: "Humbly I adore Thee, hidden Deity—Who beneath these symbols art concealed from me—Wholly in submission, Thee my spirit hails—For in contemplating Thee it wholly fails." How near our God is all our supplications, and how easy of approach,—But He comes nearer still.

In Holy Communion He enters our very hearts, not by grace only, but in the Person as the Incarnate God, with His Divinity, His soul, His body. Holy Communion is the Banquet wherein Christ gives Himself to us as the Bread of Life, or rather, as the Living Bread, to transform us into Himself, to maintain the Divine Life in us; it is the fullest participation possible in the Divine Sonship of Jesus, accessible to all without distinction, for all are called to become "participators of the divine nature." What more excellent, what more efficacious means could Divine Love have invented to establish and maintain our union with Him? "He who eateth My Flesh and drinketh My Blood *abideth in Me and I in him.*" Here, in this Living Bread, is the source and nourishment of the rich supernatural life in the Catholic Church, here the divine pledge of a glorious resurrection and of life everlasting.

3. The third marvellous means of holding us near to God, and the source of the two preceding, is *the Holy Sacrifice of the Mass*. The creature is true to its nature when it confesses its total dependence on its Creator, when it acknowledges the Divine sovereignty; that is one of the elements of the virtue of religion, itself a form, of the virtue of justice. This confession and acknowledgment constitutes adoration of the Supreme Being by our self-abasement. It is no exaggeration nor mere rhetoric to say that in the presence of God this self-abasement should go as far as annihilation; but even this supreme homage could not sufficiently testify to the truth of our condition of mere creature, and God's infinite transcendence. (No doubt these words have a strangely unfamiliar, unintelligible sound for modern ears, and this for the simple reason stated at the very beginning: the "modernistic" man has utterly forgotten what it means to be a creature.) But as man has not the right to destroy his life, he substitutes creatures in his stead, principally those which serve most directly for the sustenance of his life, such as bread, wine, fruit, animals. By their immolation man acknowledges the infinite majesty and sovereignty of the Supreme Being—that God is the supreme Master of all things—and *that is sacrifice*, to which the consciousness of sin added an expiatory character. Every true sacrifice supposes a priesthood, both belong to the very essence of religion; they are as old as religion itself. (By what right, then, can one speak of a Protestant "religion"—without altar, priesthood, sacrifice?) In the Mosaic Law, God Himself fixed the forms of sacrifice: the holocausts of adoration, the peace-offerings of thanksgiving or petition, the expiatory sacrifices for sin. All these were only types and symbols of the supreme Sacrifice of the New Law.

The Holy Sacrifice of the Mass is the only one worthy of God; for here Christ Himself is both Victim and Priest—and Christ is God's own Son. In the words of the Council of Trent (Sess. 22, Can. 1.), the Mass is a true sacrifice which recalls and renews Christ's immolation on Calvary.

What a constant and powerful and eloquent reminder we have here of God, and of His supreme gift to man—the Sacrifice of Calvary for his redemption! It is indeed the “mystery of Faith” (*“mysterium Fidei”*), the mystery come forth from the very heart of a God, it is His last thought for us—the testament of His Sacred Heart. It is the sum and center of our Catholic worship. Through it we fulfill, in the most excellent manner, our fundamental duties to God. For it is through his intimate participation in this Sacrifice, by identifying himself with Christ as High-Priest and Victim, that the rational creature renders to the Creator the homage of perfect adoration, the only thanksgiving worthy of God, the sacrifice of full propitiation and powerful impenetration. Moreover, in the pertinent words of Dr. N. Gühr (“The Holy Sacrifice of the Mass,” p. 211), “the Eucharistic Sacrifice is an inexhaustible source of holy thoughts and pious emotions—always refreshing, comforting and quickening both heart and mind. At the altar all the rays of heavenly truth and grace meet as in a focus: who is there that can approach this glowing hearth without being inflamed with ardent devotion and fervent love of God? . . . This is the holy hearth where faith, hope and love are enkindled and enflamed, where the spirit of prayer is enlivened and devotion is aroused, and ascends to heaven itself. The Eucharistic Sacrifice is so constituted as to be a school in which the most manifold virtues are being awakened and nourished, strengthened and purified. From the altar proceeds the impulse to all striving after the higher virtues, after a life of perfection.”

Ah, yes! “It is the Mass that matters” for us Catholics; and herein lies the explanation of the sinister efforts of the enemies of our holy Faith to render the celebration of the Holy Sacrifice impossible. For, says St. Bonaventure, “take away this Sacrament, and what will there be left in the world but error and infidelity?”

(What prophetic words, written about 250 years before the reformation”!) “But by this Sacrament,” continues the Saint, “the Church stands, faith is confirmed, the Christian religion and Divine worship flourish.” (“On the Preparation for Mass,” I. i., 3). And Suarez calls the Holy Sacrifice an expression and vivid image of Christ's Passion, and consequently of the Incarnation and the other mysteries of Christ. (Disp. 76, 2.) These Mysteries of our Redemption are

kept vividly before our minds by the cycle of Feasts of the Liturgical year. Add to all this the sublime symbolism and the impressive solemnity of the ceremonial with which the Liturgy of the Church surrounds this central act of our holy religion,—in which the faithful are obliged to participate at least on every Sunday and Holyday,—and you will readily understand why there is no alienation from God where the Mass is held in due honor and vital appreciation. On the other hand, it will cause small wonder that infidelity and irreligion followed so closely on the heels of the “reformation,” and its rejection of the Holy Sacrifice.

4. The Church has still other excellent means of keeping man in touch with his God.

Confession is an essential part of the Sacrament of Penance instituted for the remission of grievous sins committed after Baptism. Christ might have chosen to perform this work directly, given the sincere repentance of the sinner. The fact is, however, that, in harmony with his general Plan, He chose to do it through the ministration of men, His priests; to them He communicated His power of forgiving sins. The repugnance which some experience in this matter finds its rich compensation in the many spiritual, moral and even physical advantages of Confession,—advantages which go to show how wise and helpful is this institution. It serves to keep alive the consciousness of man’s dependence on God; to humble and cure his pride; to remind him of his weakness and sinfulness, of his duty and responsibility to God; by frequent self-examination, self-judgment and self-accusation, man comes to know himself and his besetting dangers.

In the Confessional the priest is not only a judge; he is likewise a physician to heal the past, and a counselor to give prudent direction for the future,—all in the gentle sympathetic spirit of his Divine Master, the Good Shepherd. Modern Psychiatry is throwing much light on the evils and dangers of “repression”; many grave neuroses result from the lack of opportunity to “unbosom oneself,” to pour into the ear of a trusted friend the imprisoned secrets that are crushing the soul. Even some Protestant ministers are coming to recognize all this, and have inaugurated “confession” hours in their churches. Experience shows that those who are minded “to go directly to God with their sins,” usually go to the Ego, thus exposing themselves to the subtle dangers and manifold pitfalls of self-delusion. And if it is generally true that “no one is a competent judge in his own cause,” it is especially so in what concerns the moral and spiritual life, where prudent and intelligent guidance is indispensable.

The "soul naturally Christian" finds *Devotion to the Mother of God and to His Saints* easy and natural; it feels its approach to God markedly facilitated thereby. The finest instincts of the human heart revolt at the very thought of ignoring the Mother of Him Who is our all in all. If Christ is God, then Mary is truly His Mother. While remaining a creature, she is the most exalted and most privileged of all creatures, and her power of intercession and example must be great indeed. Who that believes all this, will not find it most congenial to honor and implore the Son through His Mother? And the Saints—are they not God's intimate friends? Are they not those who have become most closely "conformed to the image of His Son"—beings like ourselves, men and women who have so faithfully modeled their lives on that of the Divine Exemplar? "God is wonderful in His Saints," and, by the celebration of their Feasts, by the veneration of their relics and images, the soul is uplifted and inspired to draw nearer to Christ by imitating the virtues of these living ideals of Christian perfection in every walk and condition of life. "They could do it, why not we?"

Finally, the Church provides the inspirations of her eloquent liturgical Symbolism, of music, of painting, sculpture, architecture; the charms of form, movement, color, sound,—all harmoniously conspiring to quicken the imagination, thrill the heart, raise the mind to thoughts celestial, stir the affections and the will to noble aspiration, high resolve, godly endeavor and achievement. "Sursum corda—Lift up your hearts!" May they dwell in heaven, your true home, even during this, your earthly pilgrimage. Thus Mother Church lovingly and constantly surrounds her children with the atmosphere of the spiritual and the supernatural; fully realizing that men are not pure spirits, she has recourse to all that has a telling, irresistible appeal to what is best and noblest in the totality of their composite nature; she is ever seeking to counteract the powerful and unceasing pull and drag to things earthly, crass, carnal; ever reminding her children of their exalted destiny,—and all this by methods which have a compelling attraction for all, high and low, cultured and unlettered. "Strongly and sweetly," under the guidance of the Spirit of Truth, Beauty and Grace, she applies the divinely given means, while surrounding them with appropriate dignity and reverence.

What has been said thus far shows, at least to some degree, the congenial aptitude for the needs of human nature, and the marvelous efficacy, of the means so condescendingly vouchsafed by Incarnate Wisdom, for establishing, promoting and maintaining in individuals and society, vital contact and union with God, and thus

precluding that alienation from Him, to which our fallen and utterly selfish nature is so constantly exposed.

And it is an established historical fact that it was the worthy and constant use of all these helps which, in the ages of Faith,—and pre-eminently in the thirteenth century, when Christianity was in full flower,—made Christ and God a living, vibrant, pulsing, supreme influence in every field of human endeavor, with the consequent achievements—religious, literary, artistic, social, economic.

IV.

1. Now, at the dawn of the sixteenth century, there arose certain individuals who took it upon themselves to “reform” the incomparable works of divine wisdom and love. By their repudiation of the one true Church, they rejected at one fell swoop, all or the most important of these singularly appropriate and adequate aids for facilitating the soul’s approach to God, and for maintaining the vital consciousness of Him and of His supreme rights and interests in private and public life. In their futile and fatuous attempt to destroy God’s Church, the “reformers” utterly failed to take into account and to realize the fact that they were simultaneously doing violence to human nature,—outraging and ignoring its most vital needs. Their Psychology was not a whit better than their Theology.

Not long after the calamitous revolt had rent the seamless robe of Christ by the dismemberment of Christian unity, the inevitable process of further aberrations set in. In practice, as in doctrine, the primary vitiating cause proceeded to produce its effects with inexorable logic. More or less rapidly, according to the variations of individuals and societies, during certain periods imperceptibly, at least to the mass of mankind,—but none the less surely,—the poison of alienation from Christ and God was working its way through the severed branches and organisms to which the sap of supernatural life no longer had access, and which had been ruthlessly robbed of the precious means for ascent to God and for the preservation of communion with Him.

2. The denial of the one external infallible authority in faith and morals, and the substitution of private judgment in all matters, deprived fallible man of the only sufficiently firm anchorage for the native instability of human thought; it did away with the one adequate safeguard against the corrosive tendencies of analytical reason,—two limitations of the mind so much in evidence in every period of the history of thought. The “reformers” opened wide the door to subjectivism, rationalism, agnosticism. There followed the medley of mutually contradictory sects and systems, with the storm and

stress of controversies. But it is with the practical results of false doctrines that we are concerned.

With the rejection of Sacrifice and Priesthood were banished the supreme means for the fulfillment of man's fundamental duties to God, for the exercise of the essential acts of religion; the rebellious sects ceased to have any religion and worship worthy of the name. It is a strong affirmation, but true nevertheless, that in this respect the evangelical churches fell below the level of the natural and the Mosaic religion, both of which always had their sacrifice and priesthood,—institutions belonging to the very essence of religion. Their religious service not only became impotent to communicate to men the precious fruits of the Redemption, but it was unable to upraise man's whole soul to God because it failed to quicken his whole being and personality. In both respects it became a cold and bare and barren thing. Preaching became its mainstay—the pulpit replaced the altar. Gone was the soul-stirring symbolism of the Liturgy, Feasts, public Devotions. There followed the gloomy bondage of a melancholy Puritanism. The attraction and the appeal, the support and the consolation, the divine warmth and the benign influence of the Real Presence was gone. Gone was that which had made of the churches veritable houses of God, real Tabernacles of the Most High. The churches became mere "meeting houses" where men met their God in no more real and true sense that they could do in the privacy of their homes. Gone was the most excellent means—here on earth of man's real and personal union with God, Holy Communion; gone was this Bread of Angels, this supersubstantial food for nourishing man's spiritual life, for neutralizing the poisons of sin and corruption. Gone was the Confessional, that refuge and haven whither frail man, sorely tempted and perplexed, could ever repair with entire trust and confidence, assured of a warm and sincere and sympathetic welcome, of consolation and encouragement. Man had constituted himself the sole and supreme arbiter of all his acts and omissions. The Mother of God was no longer the Mother of men, interceding for them at the throne of mercy. There can be no doubt that the refusal of the honors due to the Divine Maternity of the Blessed Virgin was one of the foremost practical causes leading up to the denial of the Divinity of Christ. The "Communion of Saints" was no more; struggling humanity was no longer to be drawn by the example of the noblest of the race, nor cheered by the consoling certainty of their intercession. All the spiritual pathways of approach to God—pathways so attractive, so congenial, so helpful to man's whole psychic content—were totally barred: man was told to seek God as best he

could—for was not every one his own priest and teacher and moralist? *The non-Catholic world was Church-less and un-religious.*

3. The all-important question, "What think ye of Christ?" was no longer answered after the prompt and unfaltering manner of St. Peter: "Thou art Christ, the Son of the living God." Men were beginning to doubt and to question the Lord; they were "dividing Christ"; He began to be ignored, as a paramount and divine influence in the family and the affairs and occupations of men; in education, legislation, statesmanship; in science, art, literature. Individualism, Liberalism, Secularization were growing apace. The sublime, vivifying and ennobling truths and realities vouchsafed by divine revelation were paling in proportion as positive, practical Christianity was losing its grip on men's lives; in thought and life the supernatural waned while Naturalism waxed ever stronger and bolder. Religious practice was a matter of respectability and mainly social in its nature. The separated churches were bowing to State Absolutism and growing nationalistic and naturalistic. The false prophets and enemies of Christ quite consistently leveled their main attacks on Christ's Spouse, the Catholic Church. In this they were loyally and vigorously abetted by infidel governments and godless statesmen; all the means which diabolical ingenuity could invent were marshalled to hamper the spiritual activities of the Church, to discredit her Hierarchy and Orders, especially her most valiant and gifted champions, the noble sons of St. Ignatius.—*The Church-less world was becoming Christ-less.*

4. Despite the powerful support of the secular princes, and notwithstanding all the preachments and disquisitions, the non-Catholic world was evincing a constantly decreasing receptivity for things supersensible and spiritual; it was increasingly materialistic, utilitarian, selfish. God's rights and interests ceased to matter. He was not a living Reality, a personal Influence in the life and consciousness of individuals and nations. The basic relations of creature to Creator, the fundamental truth of man's utter dependence on God, of his elementary duties of the knowledge, love and service of God, the sense of his personal responsibility to a Supreme Judge, of sinfulness, guilt and the fear of God—all these were fast fading from man's consciousness. Private and public conscience was being dulled and deadened; impiety and immorality were rampant in high and low places. With the State deified and the Ego glorified, modern paganism was an accomplished fact: *The Christ-less world had become Godless.*

This summary outline can be readily filled out and verified by facts and details to be found in any impartial history of the culture

and civilization of the post-"reformation" period (e. g., Balmes "European Civilization").

Towering human pride had placed man on a high pedestal; it had arrogated to him rights, privileges and powers which were not his; a direct and individual ascent to God without Church, Sacrifice, Sacraments and other indispensable aids. But human nature is very realistic and self-assertive and jealous of her rights—and vindictive when these are outraged. Those who counted on super-men had pulled man down to a level below the human.

5. The evaluation of cause and effect in the matter under consideration is corroborated by a parallel process evidenced in the salient phase of thought after the "reformation." It is a sad and sorry tale of the vagaries of reason refusing the guidance of divine revelation. The first sinister brood of a Church-less mind were the Deists. These free-thinkers reduced to a system the ever-growing practical denial of Christ by the preceding generations. But they went further: they proceeded to push God Himself into the background by the negation of His Providence. They found a congenial soil in the Empiricism of Locke. Hume's Scepticism was followed by English Utilitarianism and Agnosticism, with the Cagliostrie impostures of the now discredited Spencer. Then was staged "The Comedy of Evolution,"—materialistic evolution! we mean—with the subsequent Haeckelian frauds and forgeries; it still treads the boards, with a new vaudeville act inserted now and then, and an occasional change of costumes and scenery. In France we witness the sentimental and neurotic imbecilities of a Rousseau; the mephistophelian grin and sneer and hatred of everything Christian of a Voltaire, the rank materialism and blank atheism of the Encyclopedists—all heading straight for the orgies of the French Revolution. Of course, the whole force of their satanic hatred for Christ was directed against the one institution which alone accepted Him whole and undivided, and unflinchingly championed His rights and interests—the Catholic Church. Then came the conceited shallowness of Comte and the Positivists who thought to deify humanity by writing it with a capital H.

In Germany the "Illuminati" were popularized by men with tendencies similar to those of the French Encyclopedists. Lessing's publication of the "fragments" of Reimarus may be said to have inaugurated the "higher criticism"—the rationalizing of the Gospel, of its miracles and of the Person of Christ. Everywhere there was disintegration, uncertainty, bewilderment. Then came Kant with his two Critiques—sophistically dividing off reason into two compartments. To Pure Reason was allotted the function of arranging the

chaos of the sensible phenomena of the material universe according to the mind's innate forms and categories; to Practical Reason belonged all matters moral, spiritual, religious, of which Pure Reason could know nothing. But instead of curing existing evils, Kant's theory of the theoretical reason gave rise to most of the subsequent Idealisms, Agnosticisms, Pantheisms; it set in motion the mental acrobatics of the German metaphysicians Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, etc., who discredited metaphysics to the extent of producing a reaction in favor of crass materialism; then sick to death of materialism, the world turned for relief to pseudo-mysticism—the pendulum of thought swinging from one extreme to the other. Kant's theory of the practical reason produced the tendency to non-dogmatic Christianity, relegating faith and religious truth to the regions of subjective feeling and vague sentiment. The "categorical imperative" makes man autonomous; under the influences of this autonomy, man will not accept moral law even from God: the finite rational creature becomes greater than God. Most of the modernistic philosophical and religious thought is vitiated by Kantian principles.

In the meantime "higher criticism," with the aid of one or the other of the German metaphysics—and there were many varieties—was reaching the heights, not indeed of true criticism, but of absurdity, in its vain attempts to destroy the historical and supernatural character of Christianity. Comes then the "omnium gatherum," of all the pseudo-philosophical and heterodox "isms," Modernism, that colossal hypocrisy seeking to cloak its rank infidelity and agnosticism with the terminology of orthodox belief. To what deplorable degree it has infected contemporaneous thought, and what spiritual havoc Protestant rationalistic Theology is working among clergy and people—all this is so well known as to render its detailing superfluous.

6. In the course of the last four centuries then, theoretical thought in this matter proceeded along lines parallel with those of practical life. In the latter the rejection of the Church's means of sanctification led to the disappearance of the Divine Christ and then of the personal God from human consciousness, and ended in the deification of the world and self. The former, as it has just been briefly sketched, presents the corresponding stages of schism and heresy, infidelity, atheism, the variegated forms of pantheism.

In our own day, considerable wonderment is evoked by the fact that so many otherwise sane and intelligent people should be duped or even attracted by the jumble and jargon, the slogans and catchwords, the grain of truth under a heap of rubbish—of such silly

cults as Spiritism, Christian Science, New Thought, Theosophy, and others of their ilk. But let it be remembered that men in the pangs of hunger are not discriminating in their choice of food; and these many,—robbed of their God, of the congenial ways of approaching Him, of the daily inbreathing of genuinely Christian ideas and ideals,—are aimlessly groping for the food to satisfy their soul's hunger and inborn craving for God, avidly grasping at anything that has the least semblance of such food. How many are spiritually dying, stifling in the soul-begriming atmosphere of a Godless, creedless, codeless world!

“For man has sinned, has sinned,
 Allowing doubt to eat his heart away.
 His heart is heavy and grey.

 Has he no memory of the wrong
 The cunning prophets did him who destroyed
 The living creed that he enjoyed?
 Which sent him soaring like a bird in air—
 Like a lark singing; like an eagle strong—
 Which drew up, rather than builded up, the stair
 His spirit used to gambol into prayer;
 Lifting, as a church its spire,
 His voice in the ecstatic choir
 To pierce the heavens, sharp with strong desire.”

(Theodore Maynard's "Ode in Time of Doubt.")

The sincere and earnest Protestant of today likewise feels, very keenly at times, the sad and poignant void in the practical side of his religion; it leaves churches empty; it fails to attract; it falls short of satisfying the yearnings and aspirations of the soul. But while our hearts go out to him in sincerest sympathy and appreciative understanding, we fervently pray that he may soon come to recognize the real and radical cause of this spiritual emptiness and frigidity. Why not accept the witness of impartial history? It will tell him that it was not always thus. It will show him that there was a time in the Christian world when there was no “absence of the spirit of worship,” nor “lack of holy symbolism,” nor “idolatry of the sermon instead of the worship of God,” nor “half-filled or empty churches,” nor any of the other spiritual ailments deplored and misunderstood. That was the time when all Christians made a whole-souled use of the precious aids appointed by God for drawing men's souls to Himself in a manner most natural and

congenial to them. This same witness of true history will then give evidence,—that the rejection of these helps was soon followed by the alienation of man from his religious duties and from God Himself. Was this sequence of events one of time merely? By no means. It was a “post hoc *et propter* hoc.” There was the profoundest causal relation between the rejection and the alienation: given the former, the latter was bound to follow from the very nature of the case—human nature—man’s whole psychic makeup.

For the present moral and spiritual bankruptcy in private and public life there is only one efficacious remedy: a whole-hearted return to the true Church; for the cause of the world’s plight is its estrangement from God; but the way to God is solely through Christ, “for there is no other name given to man in which man can be saved” here or hereafter; and there is only one true way to the fulness of Christ—His one Church: only there is He found whole and undivided; only there His teaching and His means of sanctification and salvation are found in all their original purity and plenitude and power. The Catholic Church alone can Christianize the modern paganism as successfully as it did the ancient.

REV. J. S. ZYBURA.

THE DELPHIC ORACLE

"Oraculum; quod inest in his deorum oratio."—Cicero.

"Voluntas divina hominis ore enuntiata."—Seneca.

ORACLES in the familiar sense flourished best in Greece and Hellenized areas, though even here the estatic element probably came from the East. The local element, however, and the practice of interpreting voices as heard in the wind, fire and water, was rooted in Greek religion. All persuasion involves a reference more or less direct, to conduct and action, and it is concerned more or less directly, with the future.

Religious persuasion, dealing as it does largely with the supernatural, and what is beyond our everyday experience, its tendency is to appeal not to facts but to principles that, derived from authority and tradition, have acquired the sanction of accepted truths. From circumstances such as these arose the downfall of Delphi. Partly in reaction against Apollo, partly in imitation of him, other oracles were restored or created. It was believed that many difficult paths adapted to different nations and grades of knowledge converged to the same Divinity, and that the most erroneous religion is good if it forms good dispositions and inspires virtuous actions.

The attempt to define the word "oracle" confronts us at once with the difficulties of the subject. The Latin term, indeed, which we are forced to employ, points specially to cases where the voice of God or spirit was actually heard, whether directly or through some human intermediary. But the corresponding Greek term merely signifies a seat of soothsaying, a place where divinations are obtained by whatever means. And we must not regard the oracles of Greece as rare and majestic phenomena, shrines founded by a full-grown mythology for the direct habitation of a god. Rather they are the products of a long process of evolution, the modified survivals from among countless holy places of a primitive race.

It is true to say, then, that at no epoch of Greek society that we can yet discover, was Greek religion wholly confined within the bonds of clan, tribe, or city. Nor does it appear at any time to have been true of Greek morality that its outlook was limited to the circle of kindred and did not include the alien and stranger. One of the clearest proofs of this is the great antiquity of the ritual of oath-taking and of the moral feeling about perjury as a primary sin against the divinity in whose name a person was forsworn. The ancient religious,

ceremony of the oath has a peculiar interest because it was a form of communion between the oath-taker and the divine power invoked; for, as more than one passage in the Homeric poems and the record of the old Attic ritual in the Court of the Areopagus attest, the person at the moment of swearing put himself into touch or *rapproch* with some object that established a mystical current between himself and the divinity, and perhaps in the most primitive stage of thought the curse set in motion by perjury, as in the ordeal, was spontaneously destructive or blasting.

"Greek oracles," in the words of Myers, "reflect for a thousand years the spiritual needs of a great people. They draw their origin from an Animism which almost all races share, and in their early and inarticulate forms they contain a record of most of the main currents in which primitive beliefs are wont to run. Afterwards—closely connected both with the idea of supernatural possession and with the name of the sun-god Apollo—they exhibit a singular fusion of nature-worship with Shamanism or sorcery. Then, as the non-moral and naturalistic conception of the deity yields to the moral conception of him as an idealised man, the oracles reflect the change, and the Delphian god becomes in a certain sense the conscience of Greece."

At first Apollo appears to us as the god of the sweet springtime, and of rural life; the heavenly shepherd leading his flocks to the mountains. He calls up before us an image of peace, of pure felicity.¹ He is at the same time, the god of the lyre, with the Muses for companions; the god of song and music, the inspirer of all poetry. But this firstborn of light is above all the god of prophecy, the great revealer to men of the thought and will of Zeus. Nor does he merely reveal the law of good. He is also the Purifier, the Restorer, in a word the atoning god. He has had need to make expiation for himself; for though he is the beneficent god, he is also the god who slays, the terrible archer whose deathful dart, like the burning ray of the sun, consumes the life it has created. His silver bow is as formidable as the weighty arms of Ares. But it is not in his nature to smite past recovery. Those whom he wounds, he heals. His divine son Æsculapius represents this aspect of his nature, which is one of the noblest. There is, however, an evil more to be dreaded than plague or pestilence. This is the sin which defiles the soul and arouses the anger of the gods, such defilement reaching its culminating point in murder. Apollo was able to wash away this stain even from the most guilty, all the more because he had himself known the need of purification and expiation; for though he had wrought a great deliverance in slaying the Lernean Hydra, he had nevertheless contracted the defilement

¹ Strabo, 9, 3, 6. ,

which necessarily follows murder, and his long captivity with Admetus was his expiation. This sovereign god had had then his access of passion. The memory of it was perpetuated every year during the barbarous ages, by the immolation of human victims chosen from among great criminals; and subsequently by the sending away into the desert of a youth who represented the exile of the god. His power to deliver knew no bounds. If the fugitive murderer received on his brow the blood of the atoning victim, and was touched by the sacred laurel, he was thus placed under the protection of the merciful god. Hence, Apollo was called the saviour god, and was regarded as the redeemer from much evil.

Greek religion is presented to us by its various records mainly as a polytheism of personal divinities, grouped in certain family relationship around and under a supreme god. Theoretically the chief divinity is male in sky, earth, and sea, but in certain localities the goddess-cult is more powerful. The higher beings are rarely recognizable as personifications of physical forces of nature, and it is only of a very few of them that a nature-origin can be posited or proved. At a few of the lesser oracles, a person who consulted them had to observe preliminary rites of purification.

A point, the determination of which must have gone some way towards regulating the shape and arrangement of the early maps, was the position of the centre of the Earth's surface. This was fixed at Delphi for the Greeks by religious associations, in the same way as at a later time Jerusalem became the central point of the world in the minds of Dante and his contemporaries. The popular belief on this subject gave rise to the fable which Pindar relates, that two eagles which were let go by Zeus, the one from the east, the other from the west, met at Delphi.² Apollo himself was reputed to have selected this spot as the chosen seat of his worship and the fame of the wealth of its temple and the wisdom of its oracle dated from the earliest period of Greek history, for both of these are mentioned in the Homeric poems. In the *Iliad*, Achilles speaks of the riches that were stored at Pytho as being comparable to the possessions of the Ilium;³ and in the *Odyssey*, Agamemnon is related to have obtained thence an oracular response before proceeding to Troy.⁴ By degrees it became more and more the political as well as the religious centre of the country, for its influence was exerted in the direction of holding the Greek states together and counteracting their centrifugal tendencies, and its wide outlook and practical sagacity in all matters which affected the

² Il., 9, 401-5.

³ Od., 8, 79-81.

⁴ Herod., 5, 42.

Hellenic community caused it to be generally resorted to for the sake of the good counsel which it supplied. "This was especially the case," wrote Toger, "at the time of the foundation of the Greek colonies, for the influence which the oracle exercised in regulating that movement was so great, that when the Spartan Dorieus met with disaster in endeavouring to found a colony in Libya, his failure was attributed to his having neglected to consult the god beforehand." "The national position which Delphi thus obtained caused it to be regarded not only metaphorically, but locally, as the middle point of Greece—a character which it might fairly claim from its geographical situation; and since Greece was considered by its inhabitants to occupy a central position among the countries of the world, this place came to be called "the navel of the Earth" and the idea was formally expressed on the maps, so that Delphi became the starting point of their construction."⁵

Of equal importance for the possibility of national union were the early Amphiktyones, or organizations of different tribes and peoples for the protection and management of some common temple; and before the idea of such a policy could have arisen, religion must have overpassed the narrow tribal stage. The salient and most interesting example of such an Amphiktyony, a word which properly signifies "the union of the peoples who dwell around a temple," was the Delphic. What were the political conditions that facilitated this union is a question that does not concern us. What suggested to these Amphiktyones, who were originally organized to protect a temple of Demeter near Thermopylæ, to concern themselves with Delphi, was the growth of the oracle to a position of international importance, and to this position it must have begun to approach in the Homeric or pre-Homeric period. For the list of the various members of the league reflects the ethnic conditions of an age prior to the Ionic migrations and the Dorian conquest of the Peloponnese, an age also when the tribe rather than the Polis was the dominating factor of society.⁶ The oath taken by the members, preserved by Æschines, bound them "not to destroy any city of the league, not to cut any one of them off from spring-water, either in war or peace, and to war against any who violated these rules." The oath may have been broken, and Demosthenes might speak slightly of "the Delphic shadow"; but the text, which has the ring of genuine antiquity, is a priceless document of Greek social-religious history, for it proclaimed, however falteringly, the ideal of an inter-tribal mortality and concord. On a large scale this was never realized in the tragic history of Greece:

⁵ Toger: "Historical Geography."

⁶ vide Farnell: "Cults," vol. iv., pp. 182-185.

nevertheless, the unrealized aspirations of any religion retain their value. Here we can only glance at its main effects of the Delphic oracle. Certain legends pointedly suggest that it had assisted the Doric migration into the Peloponnese; and at least from the eighth century onwards it is the most potent Panhellenic force in Greek religious institutions. It directed the counsels of States, and had at times the opportunity of inspiring their legislation; it fostered and aided by invaluable advice the expanding colonization of Greece, and was able thereby to bind the new colonies by indissoluble ties to Delphi. It might claim even to dispose of territory. In religious matters its influence was of the greatest, and it helped to diffuse a general system of purification from bloodshed; and when after the fifth century its political authority waned, it served in some sort as a confessional whereto troubled and conscience-stricken minds might resort. The records almost, in fact, suggest an ambition on the part of Delphi to play the same part in relation to the Greek cities as the mediæval Papacy played in relation to the States of Christendom. But an ecclesiastic domination was rendered impossible in Greece, partly by the absence of genius at Delphi, but mainly by the stubborn independence and centrifugal instincts of the Greek Polis. Finally, we may note one historic fact in the history of Delphi, that may have been of importance for the expansion of the horizon of Greek religion. In the seventh and sixth centuries a great non-Hellenic power, the monarchy of Lydia, is found to be consulting and courting the favour of the Delphic Apollo.

Lecky is hardly correct when he says that nothing analogous to the ancient oracles was incorporated with Christianity.⁷ There is the notable case of the god Sosthenion, whom Constantine identified with the archangel Michael, and whose oracular functions were continued in a precisely similar manner by the latter. Oracles that were not thus absorbed and supported were recognized as existent, but under diabolic control, and to be tolerated, if not patronized, by the representatives of the dominant religion. The oracle at Delphi gave forth prophetic utterances for centuries after the commencement of the Christian era; and was the less dangerous, as its operations could be stopped at any moment by holding a saintly relic to the god or devil Apollo's nose. There is a fable that St. Gregory, in the course of his travels, passed near the oracle, and his extraordinary sanctity was such as to prevent all subsequent utterances. This so disturbed the presiding genius of the place, that he appealed to the saint to undo the baneful effects his presence had produced; and Gregory benevolently wrote a letter to the devil, which was in fact

⁷ Scot, book vii., ch. i.

a license to continue the business of prophesying unmolested. This nonsensical fiction shows clearly enough that the oracles were not generally looked upon as extinguished by Christianity. As the result of a similar policy we find the names and functions of the pagan gods and the earlier Christian saints confused in the most extraordinary manner; the saints assuming the duties of the moribund deities where those duties were of a harmless or necessary character.⁸

From Bible history we learn that Assyria led Israel into captivity about 721 B. C., and that Babylon did the like with Juda 116 years afterwards. In the interval the centre of power had passed from Nineveh to Babylon, wherein was involved a religion change of a typical character. By a common process the Assyrian gods were assimilated to the Babylonian deities and invoked under their names. We know how the Delphic Oracle passed from Ge to Apollo—that is, from a Chthonian deity to a sky-god, which is a great transmutation of character from darkness to light. The cause was the driving out of the pre-Hellenic people by a Hellenic. It is often thought that the transition must have been violent, needing an intermediate headship of Themis, the daughter of Ge. Many deny that there was violence:—"What was the transition from Ge to Apollo? According to Æschylus, Themis succeeded her mother in the possession of the Oracle, she in turn being succeeded by her sister Phœbe, who made a birthday present to her prophetic shrine, and even of her name, to Apollo. Apart from the story of Phœbe, the history of the transition, as given by Æschylus, accords substantially with the statements of Pausanias, Aristinous of Corinth, Plutarch and Strabo. According to these there was a peaceful succession of cults, culminating in that of Apollo" (pp. 20, 21). At any rate, under the Apolline headship, the Chthonian features were retained of a cleft in the rock whence issued vapours, and of a sacred well, Kassotis.

This Delphi, the seat of Apollo's temple and of the Pythia, was lost to the knowledge of men for a thousand years and more. Over its site, till the year 1890, spread the primitive mountain village, Castri, and scholars had even been in doubt whether this village were the site of Delphi or not. Then the French dug, and by 1899 the complete plan of Delphi outlined in stone, precisely as it was described by Pausanias 1700 years before, stood revealed. You may now look from the platform of Apollo's shrine and call up some faint semblance of what Delphi was like in the days of its glory.

Recent French excavations discovered no traces of these; but the suggested account for them, as given by Father Dempsey, is that they may have been small objects obliterated by earthquakes. He

⁸ Middleton's "Letter from Rome."

adds another consideration bearing on the Chthonian inheritance from Ge to Apollo: "The idea that Delphic inspiration was due to mephitic vapour rests wholly on the authority of later writers; the early writers are absolutely silent on the matter. The materializing of the influence, so as to make it definitely sensuous, was the work of a later day." It has been asserted that not to be outdone, Dordona copied from Delphi the Pythia with the accompanying spring, which they made sacred to Zeus and Dione.

DELPHI (Kastri), a small town in Phocis, but one of the most celebrated in Greece, on account of its oracle of Apollo. It was situated on a steep declivity on the south slope of Mt. Parnassus, and its site resembled the cavea of a great theatre. It was shut in on the north by a barrier of rocky mountains, which were cleft in the centre into two great cliffs with peaked summits, between which issued the waters of the Castalian spring. It was regarded as the central point of the whole earth, and was hence called the "navel of the earth." It was originally called PYTHO, by which name it is alone mentioned in Homer. Delphi was colonized at an early period by Doric settlers from the neighbouring town of Lycorea, on the heights of Parnassus. The government was in the hands of a few distinguished families of Doric origin. From them were taken the chief magistrates and the priests. The temple of Apollo contained immense treasures; for not only were rich offerings presented to it by kings and private persons, but many of the Greek states had in the temple separate thesauri, in which they deposited, for the sake of security, many of their valuable treasures.

The Greeks firmly believed that in the difficulties of life it was always possible to obtain supernatural guidance by consulting an oracle. Divination by means of oracles, that is, through shrines where the answers delivered by priests to inquirers were regarded as inspired by the god worshipped there, was a peculiarly Hellenic institution, though, of course, divination by this and other means is common to many races. There were several Greek oracular shrines, but none so famous, or so widely consulted, as the Oracle of Apollo at Delphi. Apollo's temple was there built on a wide shelving ledge of rock deep in the valley of the Pleistus under the heights of Mount Parnassus. Sheer walls of cliff, eight hundred feet high, meeting at a very obtuse angle, form the background of the scene. At the point where the two walls meet is a narrow gorge, down which falls a stream which in winter is a foaming cascade. This stream is the fountain Castalia. The cliffs were called Phaedriades, the "Gleaming" Rocks, because the sun at his rising darts shafts of light from them before his disc shows over the top. For some moments the

rocks themselves appear to radiate light. Between 1500 and 2000 feet below, through a tangle of trees and grass and bushes, flows the Pleistus. The natural scene is one of wild beauty, and the effect was heightened in ancient times by the contrast with the sacred buildings which the veneration of the Hellenes for the awe and mystery of the place had raised there. Everything was calculated to exalt the religious feelings of the worshipper who came to consult the god. If he came from the Gulf of Corinth by the long road up from the port of Cirrha (now Itéa),⁹ the splendid vision burst upon him at a sudden bend in the road. If he came by land through Phocis, he climbed for many hours through grand mountain scenery along the side of Parnassus till he came under the very gorge of Castalia.

Father Dempsey, in his study on this subject, says that the choice of a woman for the medium was usual of old, and is noticed today in spiritualistic phenomena. An enthusiasm had to be roused in a susceptible nature (*mantike entheos*), a process which differed from the scientific divination by skill in the interpretation of signs (*mantike technike*). The unskilled Pythia uttered exclamations, which had to be interpreted by an intermediary. For the gift of tongues St. Paul required the adjunct of an interpretation on the part of the spiritually gifted to the ungifted (I Cor. xiv. 17). As a passive instrument the Pythia was an unsophisticated woman of sound health. "All that was required of a Pythia was that she should have spent her life in a virtuous manner and continued to live ritualistically pure. Ordinarily she was not a very striking personage, being but a simple, unlettered peasant, having acquired nothing from art of any sort. Originally virginity was necessary; later the safeguard of marriage was preferred" (pp. 52, 53).

Its early history is, according to Strabo, legendary and the legends are variously interpreted. The foundation was ascribed to an Eponymous hero, Amphitryon, usually said to be the son of Deucalion and brother of Helen, some three hundred years previous to the Trojan war. He, being king at Thermopylæ, united the neighbouring people in the festival of Pylæa. Other accounts explained the name *Amphyktyones* as meaning "the neighbouring peoples," and connected the institution with Delphi.

The Greek who came to consult the oracle must first follow the appointed ritual to assure his personal purity, then take part in a solemn sacrifice. If the signs were all favourable, he approached the temple, and the officiating priest, a member of one of the Delphian families, received his enquiry and disappeared into the

⁹ The modern Itéa does not occupy the site of the ancient Cirrha. Cirrha was about a mile to the east.

sanctuary. In the chamber within¹⁰ sat the priestess of Apollo, the Pythoness or Pythia, a woman of mature years, consecrated to this service. To prepare herself for the ordeal, she had fasted, and bathed in the Catalian spring, eaten of the leaves of the sacred laurel and drunk of the cold waters of the spring, Cassotis. Then she mounted the tripod, the three-footed stool of inspiration, and about her stood the priests of Apollo and the "prophets," or interpreter, waiting for the inspired word that should fall from her lips. When the power of the god came upon her, the priestess writhed and twisted and threw out her arms and uttered strange cries. At last she poured out a series of more coherent sounds, which the attendant priest, or prophet, took down. This was the "response," which was subsequently given by the priest to the inquirer, generally in the form of two or more lines of hexameter verse. Sometimes the answer of the god was simple and plain, as when he forbade the men of Cnidus to cut a channel to turn the peninsula on which their city stood into an island.¹¹

Usually the clients would stand in a large hall, from which they could view the god's statue. In the centre, usually at a lower level, was the adyton, where the spring, tripod and laurel bushes were seen. Here the prophetess received the so-called divine inspiration. Nearly all oracles were administered by a group of officials, originally, no doubt, members of the same family. At Delphi she was chosen for the neighbourhood, and had to be over 50 years of age and quite ignorant. Her guidance, says a critic, was not expected to be too positive! And so oracles became proverbial for their ambiguity.

Just as at Dodona, the chthonian deity, Ge, made way for the skygod Zeus, at Delphi also she was ousted by the radiant sungod Apollo. To the Greek mind prophecy was necessarily associated with earth divinities. According to the ancient belief, expressed by Hesiod and Homer, it was in the bowels of the earth, in the roots of the world that those ancient laws resided which regulated the world's development. From that quarter, therefore, knowledge of the future naturally proceeded. Hence, too, at Delphi vestiges of the chthonian cult even when the chthonian deities themselves had receded far into the background; and it would appear, in fact, that Pythian Apollo was in possession of

¹⁰ One would like to believe in the cleft or chasm in the rock beneath the sanctuary out of which rose a strange intoxicating vapor, and that it was above this that the tripod of the priestess was placed. Later tradition, beginning with Strabo, the geographer, is precise in describing all this. But certainly there was no traces of any such rift or cleft in the floor of the temple of Apollo when excavated by the French. It is all solid stone.

¹¹ Herodotus, i., 174

prophetic power at Delphi by right of sovereignty rather than assimilation. Whether Apollo's accession was violent or peaceful—"a birthday present," as Æschylus has it—is not ascertained. but antiquity, as revealed by the prevalence of certain legends, leaned towards the former view, which history, too, supports by parallel instances.

The statement of Æschylus is necessarily somewhat *ex parte*. He is a monotheist and moreover he is "all for the Father." In dealing with the religion of Delphi he is confronted with the awkward fact that Zeus at Delphi had no official cult, the oracle was in the hands of Apollo. Moreover, that oracle was actually delivered by a woman seated over a cleft in the earth and inspired not only by the laurel she chewed but by mephitic vapours that rose from the earth. In all this Zeus was—nowhere. Yet the supremacy of Zeus was to Æschylus the keystone of his beautiful faith in a right that was beyond might, a thing to be preserved even in the face of seeming facts. A lesser soul would have turned obscurantist, would have juggled with facts; a more conventional mind would have accepted orthodox tradition and claimed that Apollo conquered by force. That to Æschylus was no conquest at all. The solution he gives us in the prologue is utterly Æschylean and in a sense strangely modern. There has been not a fight but a development,¹² not even, as in the *agon* of the play, a reconciliation and sudden conversion, but a gradual emergence and epiphany of godhead from strength to strength from Gaia to Zeus.

It appears the more probable, that the son of Semale was a later arrival at Delphi, and that, choosing the lesser of two evils, the Apolline priests "received him with open arms" as one who had borne down all opposition and bade fair to prove their own undoing in the event of hostility. In Homer, Dionysius cuts a sorry figure, and it is noteworthy, too, that in the Theban myth Dionysius is little more than a man, just a degree above Heracles. Yet we find that in the sixth century at Athens he is the central figure in the Anthesteria, and the Greater and Lesser Eleusinia. Like Apollo, he is the inspirer of profane poetry, and described as leader of the Muses. In a vase of particularly interesting composition (published by the Imperial Archaeolog. Commission of Petrograd

¹² The same notion of development comes out in the *Prometheus*, as has been well observed by Miss Janet Case (*Class. Rev.* 1902, p. 195). "It has not," writes Miss Jane Harrison, "I think been recognized in the *Supplices*; but Prof. Murray points out to me that the keynote of the play is the transition from violence to persuasion. Ares, who is—violence and hurt personified—must give way to Aphrodite as Peitho. So only can the Danaides, fertility-nymphs, like the Sennæ, bring peace and prosperity to the barren land. See also for the same idea in the story of Io, *Rise of the Greek Epic*,"², p. 291.

(*Comt. Rend.*, 1861), the god of Delphi and Delos is represented as standing at the foot of the sacred palm tree above the omphalos and receiving Dionysus by the hand, admitting him into the partnership of his attributes, while around stand the satyrs and other followers of the winegod. The legend of Orpheus gives striking expression to the mysterious relationship that existed between these deities. This son or priest of Apollo was torn asunder by the Bacchantes, but subsequently by a strange evolution became priest of Dionysus and founder of the Mysteries. The enthusiastic mantic of Delphi was apparently of Dionysiac origin, and the tripod which was situated in the sanctuary beside the tomb of Dionysius, seems to have been variously associated with Dionysiac worship. At the feasts of Dionysus it was the prize granted to the victorious choregus. Yet in spite of this close relationship and notwithstanding the fact that for a quarter of each year—the three winter months—during Apollo's absence, Dionysus was in sole command at Delphi, he is not mentioned as having oracular power. One wonders was the oracle consulted during these three months, and if so, by virtue of what power did it reveal the hidden things of destiny. Or, were Dionysus and Apollo but forms of the same divinity, Dionysus being an infernal Apollo and Apollo a solar Dionysus?

At Delphi, as at Dodona, we seem to trace the relics of many a form of worship and divination which we cannot now distinctly recall. From that deep cleft "in rocky Pytho," Earth, the first prophetess, gave her earliest oracle,¹³ in days which were already a forgotten antiquity to the heroic age of Greece. The maddening vapour, which was supposed to rise from the chasm,¹⁴ belongs to nymph-inspiration rather than to the inspiration of Apollo. At Delphi, too, was the most famous of all fetish-stones, believed in later times to be the centre of the earth. At Delphi, divination from the sacrifice of goats reached an immemorial antiquity. Delphi, too, was an ancient centre of divination by fire, a tradition which survived in the name of Pyrcon, given to Hephæstus' minister, while Hephæstus shared with Earth the possession of the shrine, and in the mystic title of the Flame-kindlers, assigned in oracular utterances to the Delphian folk.

¹³ Aesch. *Eum.* 2; Paus. x., 5; cf. Eur. *Iph. Taur.* 1225 sqq.

¹⁴ Strabo, ix., p. 419, etc. In a paper read before the British Archaeological Association, March 5, 1879, Dr. Phené has given an interesting account of subterranean chambers at Delphi, which seem to indicate that gases from the subterranean Castalia were received in a chamber where the Pythia may have sat. But in the absence of direct experiment this whole question is physiologically very obscure. It is even possible that the Pythia's frenzy may be a survival from a previous Dionysiac worship at Delphi, and thus originally traceable to a quite orthodox intoxicant.

The waving of the Delphic laurel, which in later times seemed no more than a token of the wind and spiritual stirring which announced the advent of the god, was probably the relic of an ancient tree-worship, like that of Dodona, and Daphne, priestess of Delphi's primeval Earth-oracle, is but one more of the old symbolical figures that have melted back again into impersonal nature at the appearing of the God of Day. Lastly, at Delphi is laid the scene of the sharpest conflict between the old gods and the new. A laurel tree stood close by the chasm in the rock before Apollo's time and Daphnis was said to have been the first priestess of the oracle of Gaià. Here we have evidence of primitive tree-worship.

In the height of its fame, the Delphi exercised increased influence; its staff was international and expert; gold flowed freely into its coffers, and free access to it was guaranteed to pilgrims even in times of war. Its decrees were final in matters of art and religion. Had it realized its own position, its work of unification, whether as regards religion or politics in Hellas, might have been unlimited. Easily corrupted by gold, it became an end to itself. Responsible for more than one war, it drained the Colonies of revenues, and gradually got lost among its rivals.

Plutarch, who was a contemporary of Nero's, describes in several essays this lowest point of oracular fortunes. It was in the porticoes of the shrine that the most interesting of his essays were inspired. The sacred chasm had been choked with corpses because the priestess had branded the empire as another Orestes;¹⁵ and the Emperor Hadrian characteristically tested its omniscience by a question as to the birthplace of Homer. Not Delphi alone, but the great majority of Greek oracles, were at that time hushed, a silence which Plutarch ascribed partly to the tranquillity and depopulation of Greece, partly to a casual deficiency of Demons—the immanent spirits who give inspiration to the shrines, but who are themselves liable to change of circumstances, or even to death. Later, in the time of Cicero, the popular divinations were discarded, the oracles refuted and ridiculed, and the whole system of divination pronounced a political imposture, and according to Emilius before the time of Constantine numerous books had been written against the oracles.

It would seem that the central position of Delphi, and the resort to the temple of inquirers from all parts of the Hellenic world gave the priestly families unique opportunities of gathering information. The priestly houses were in touch with distant lands;

¹⁵ Dion., Cass., lxi, 14.

they had interests abroad and special sources of information. By these means also they acquired from generation to generation a sagacity in dealing with men and affairs which seldom led them astray. These powers of usefulness were shown most widely and successfully in connection with Greek colonization. The founding of new settlements by the Greeks may be said to have been carried out under the direction of the Delphic oracle. Before a band of colonists set out they invariably sought the advice of the oracle, so that Herodotus notes it as remarkable when the Spartan Dorieus, "neither took counsel of the oracle at Delphi as to the place whereto he should go, nor observed any of the customary usages";¹⁶ and evidently regards this recklessness as the cause of his failure. We can see good reason for this custom. The Delphic priests, from their knowledge of other lands, were in a position to give sound advice to intending emigrants. For there can be little doubt that it was the priests, and not the Pythoness, who really determined the substance of the responses. The Pythoness in her ecstasy babbled incoherent sounds; the priests interpreted these sounds in accordance with their judgment of what was fitting.

In an interesting section of his book, Father Dempsey proceeds to deal with the influence of the Apolline oracle in the departments of religion, morals and politics. The causes of this undoubted influence, which rested solely on moral authority, are partly to be found in the favourite geographical position of Delphi as centre of the Hellenic world, but principally in the intrinsic excellence of the Apolline religion, which adopted and appropriated the best elements of previous cults. The nature of Delphi's enthusiastic mantic is investigated, and the story of the divining process is reviewed in the light of recent discovery. The absorbing question of the oracle's genuineness is next discussed, and it is shown that the voice of antiquity, with a rare discordant note, was favourable to Apollo's claims. An occasional Lucian there was, of course, or an Euripides—though Verrall is an unsafe guide in this connection—but the verdict of Greek intellect throughout these many hundred years acquits the oracle of conscious fraud, while instances such as the test case of Croesus establish its claim to a superhuman knowledge. Some have explained this phenomenon by telepathy.

The attitude of the oracle in the political life of Hellas is described as that of fair dealing in the main, the tendency to laconise, however, being perceptible from the beginning. The apology for this tendency is found in the historical associations of the oracle with Sparta. But in general, the Delphic priests observed

¹⁶ Herodotus, v. 42.

a broad toleration, suggested by self-interest, undoubtedly, as they were dependent on the generosity of the Apolline faithful, so to speak, and could not afford to alienate any section. Unquestionably, the oracle frequently effected much good by giving sound advice to peoples plunged in the maelstrom of civil strife, and in matters of legislation it helped in the formation of constitutions by giving practical suggestions and by investing with a divine sanction the ordinances which it approved. When consulted on matters of fact or future events, the oracle usually kept on the safe side, with the help of obscurity and ambiguity.

The most dismal failure of the oracle is found in its belief that the expedition of Xerxes was sure to be successful. With this failure Father Dempsey attempts to deal fairly, but he is so unfortunate as to ignore the true explanation of the crucial phrase in the second oracular response. It must be conceded to him that the line which refers to Salamis is genuine, but the prophets could not of themselves have foreseen the site of the decisive battle. The site of the battle had been chosen by the genius of Themistocles, but without some voice from the oracle Themistocles could not have persuaded his countrymen to make their stand in the Strait of Salamis. If the oracle supplied him with a phrase which he could interpret in his own sense, we may be sure that for this phrase he had paid the price. The workers of the oracle had no belief that he could succeed, but if he opened his purse they would not refuse him the chance of an attempt. The last word on the matter was spoken by Bishop Thirlwall when he said that Themistocles "himself prepared the crisis which he afterwards stepped forward to decide."

So complete was the destruction of the architectural monuments of Delphi by the hand of nature and of man, so ruthless the pillage of its treasures by Roman and Byzantine rulers, that it is impossible to do more than trace the ground plan of the great temple of Apollo; nor can we point to a single masterpiece of the finest period of Greek art amongst the remains of sculpture which have come to light. We can, however, with the aid of the description written by the traveller Pausanias in the second century after Christ, reconstruct in imagination the precinct, not three acres in extent, which was the religious centre of ancient Greece, the seat of the god who, as Socrates says in Plato's "Republic," "sits on the navel of the earth and is the interpreter of religion to all mankind." It is true that we have learnt little or nothing that is new to us about the worship of Apollo, and, above all, about the machinery of the oracle of his inspired priestess. The Holy of Holies in which she sat, is best described by Dr. Poulsen's words:

"It was a little quadrangular building within the temple cella, erected against its south wall. . . . The Adyton was like a small box contained in a bigger one, and was, like the rest of the temple, built of limestone, had a flat wooden ceiling and four smooth walls, one of which was pierced by a door. The interior floor surface measured only fifteen square metres. In this quite small space, in which in antiquity there were consecrated weapons on the walls, a gilded statue of Apollo and the grave of Dionysus, there are still remains of stone benches on which the inquirers sat, and a staircase leading down to the vault where the tripod stood and under which ran the prophetic spring. How small is that which, in the glamour of poetry and through the religious reverence of thousands, acquired a mysterious greatness in the imaginations of men! The earth's navel—a little lump of stone; earth's mouth—a poor crack in the rock; and even 'The unapproachable,' whence all Hellas for centuries derived counsel and comfort, no bigger than a ship's cabin.

"First among intrinsic causes should be placed an enthusiastic nature," which was believed to be from the gods or from spirits. "Plutarch explains that the vapour is a mere instrument: the ultimate cause is the deity," while other causes are "the demons intermediate between gods and men." Socrates, Plato, Cicero, Seneca, Porphyry, with many others, agree to assert the preternatural influence that guided the Delphian Oracle.

Though we may be unable to allow a supernatural power to the oracle, it would yet be misleading to stamp its controllers in its best days as hypocrites or impostors. The mind is capable of much self-deception, and the authorities of Delphi may well have thought that the god inspired the priestess or medium, and not the less that her cries were usually unintelligible and sometimes inarticulate. It was their business to turn the cries into hexameters. On great occasions, such as the advance of Xerxes, they must have written the verses beforehand, and made the Pythia learn them by heart. The justification of the oracle lay in the pains which its authorities took to ascertain facts, and in the use which they made of their real knowledge and of their supposed supernatural power. The oracle was not strictly impartial, it was not above accepting a bribe; it could at times be wrong in its intention and mistaken in its policy; yet with all its faults, there was an age in which it did good service to the nations of Greece, far better service than could have been rendered if the great men of Delphi had so completely believed in the inspiration as to put their whole reliance in it. For their own good and the good of others, they have learnt the lesson that God helps those who help themselves.

Father Dempsey suggests the possibility of telepathy to account for one of the better-attested cases. The story of Cræsus in connection with the Delphic Oracle is chiefly known by his error in interpreting for his own benefit the ambiguous utterance: "Cræsus, by crossing the Halys, will destroy a mighty kingdom;" but a Delphic success is recorded in the statement that in the contest of oracles to say what Cræsus was doing at a particular moment, only the Delphic gave the exact and un conjecturable facts: "He is engaged in boiling the hard-shelled tortoise, and a lamb with brass above and brass beneath." Such knowledge "the Pythia could not have gained by any purely physical means. Those were not days of wireless telegraphy or wireless telephony. How, then, must we explain it? It is impossible to say with any degree of certainty. Perhaps it is to be explained by the laws of telepathy." The Fathers of the Church supposed evil spirits to work through the Pythia; and it was such a Pythia that St. Paul deprived of her power when she addressed him (Acts xvi. 16-18): "I command thee in the name of Jesus Christ to go out from her. And she went out from her at the same hour." Yet her declaration was true: "These men are servants of the Most High God, who preach unto you the ways of salvation." The Fathers admitted some natural insight by abnormal acuteness. In his commentary, *Genesis ad Lit*, St. Augustine says: *Anima humana secundum quod a sensibus corporis abstrahitur, competit futura prævidere*. And Gregory the Great, in his Dialogues, writes: *Ipsa aliquando animarum vis subtilitate sua aliquid prævidet*.

We cannot afford to dispense with considering it in relation to the historical and individual Reality whereof it is the form and nature, that the philosophical myth may provisionally take the place of a history which we have not at hand in memory or on record. This will be where the Soul (which must certainly here be personal Soul, for only personal Soul can philosophize) is occupied in the task which was prescribed to it long since by the Delphic oracle,¹⁷ of investigating its own nature. And not only in ancient Greece, but here and everywhere, it is in the influence of Religion which most often drives us to undertake such an investigation. It is easy to see that a genuine "revelation," in that legitimate sense of "revelation" in which it is used, of the historical and individual element in religious knowledge as contrasted with the element which is rather philosophical and universal (for in another sense we must acknowledge all religious truth to be a revelation),¹⁸ would render the device of a myth unnecessary here.¹⁹

¹⁷ Gnothi seauton.

¹⁸ Cp. "Problems in the Relations of God and Man," pp. 48, 58 ff.

¹⁹ Cp. Plato, "Phædo," 85d.

The comparison has been often made and is emphasized by Rawlinson in his note on the oracle sent to Cræsus. The Pythoness, he says, "was *really possessed* by an evil spirit which St. Paul cast out." Two generations ago, it was incumbent upon an orthodox divine, like Rawlinson, to believe in the reality of possession, but the obligation no longer exists. We are entitled to reject a supernatural explanation in cases where a natural one is possible. It is to be noted that the most critical minds of the ancient Greek world, such as those of Euripides and Aristotle, to say nothing of such later speculators as Lucian, saw nothing supernatural in the oracle, although they knew the facts at least as well as we do.

Delphi, too, was a powerful patron of art and letters, of everything in fact associated with *to kalon*. Whether the champion was a philosopher, a poet, an artist or an athlete, Pythian Apollo and his priests evinced a fostering care for his fame, and sometimes too for his entertainment. And Apollo also proved himself a benevolent deity in his attitude towards the slavery question and in the matter of colonization. "Delphi," says the author, speaking of the oracle's activity in the latter connection, "was a great intelligence bureau in communication with all parts of the known world." The greatest work of the oracle, however, lay in the domain of religion. In this matter Pythian Apollo was, as Plato has it, "the natural expositor," the conscience keeper of Hellas. With Delphi lay the final decision in questions of apotheosism or heroization, and the god is shown to have dispensed these favours, to the extent of abuse even, irrespectively of nationality or profession. Dealing with cathartic ceremonies in Apolline ritual, the most probable view seems to be that the elements of purificating ritual existed from the beginning, but took more definite form in later times with the spread of Orphism. The gods themselves, as the legends reveal, were not exempt from the law of expiation, no matter what the motive or effect of their action. In Homer certainly, there is no question of religious expiation, yet we see that the man who has shed the blood of a fellow-citizen is obliged to go into exile or pay a sum of money in reparation. The ritual of purification, too, marked a great religious advance, and Homer could have had no such motive for repressing it as existed in the case of the Chthonian deities.

Though the professional diviner—the private practitioners of seership, so to speak—were discredited, the whole community accepted the authority of the great oracles on prophetic shrines. There can be little doubt, with all its irrational proceedings, there was in the classical time nothing either charlatan or vulgar about the oracle of Delphi; and we trust Aristotle when he says that the initiated "learned

nothing in particular, but received impressions, and were brought into a certain frame of mind." On the other hand, Euripides attacked the whole system of soothsayers, divinations and oracles. But for this animosity there was a political move. Delphi, during the Peloponnesian war, had sided with Sparta. Moreover, during the debates in the Sicilian expedition, oracles and prophecies had been lavishly employed in favour of that undertaking. Here, its disastrous termination excited, among the Athenians, a strong popular feeling against the whole system of divination. At such a time it was possible for a poet to attack the system without much fear of opposition; and Euripides in some of his plays only echoes the prevailing sentiment. In particular, the Delphic oracle is often represented in an unfavourable light. Apollo, the god of Delphi, is represented in the *Ion* as a seducer of women, who endeavours to conceal his misdeeds by means of a fraudulent response. In the play *Helena*, we read these words, "False and worthless are the utterances of soothsayers, nor is wisdom to be found in flames of fire, as the or the voice of the feathered tribe. . . ."

The history of the Delphic maxims leads to interesting reflexions in the Oracle's influence of Greek morality. Oracular responses are quoted that mark the evolution from the primitive state, where external morality only was accounted, to the more perfect stage, where these matters seems to have been exaggerated in Greek literature. The famous "know thyself" motto appears to have gained all its celebrity from its association with the names of Plato and Socrates. Originally it was probably only a piece of worldly wisdom, such as is found in abundance in Hesiod. One thing, too, that has always struck me as passing strange is why Pythian Apollo declared Socrates to be the wisest of men. Yet Socrates was condemned to death for impiety by the most religious of the Greek States, and he contributed more perhaps than any other Greek to the downfall of Apollo's influence. And Euripides—who invariably scoffed at Apolline pretensions, according to Verrall—was declared by this same Apollo to be second only to Socrates in wisdom. In matters of religion and morality was Pythian Apollo a mere opportunist who kept abreast of the popular movements?

Dealing with the influence of the Delphic Oracle, political, religious and moral, Father Dempsey declares failure in the first department, because Greek States preferred their independence to a Pan-Hellenic union; but he claims some success in the other two departments, where other writers see failure. He admits that Delphic morality did not rise above the common level of morality. At other shrines, excavated tablets show the questions to have been utilitarian—interest

in business transactions, births of children, recovery of lost pillows and coverlets. Excavations at Epidaurus have the rare characters of giving the replies of the god. They are largely grotesque operations seen in vision by night, and found successful in the morning. Fees, even large ones, were exacted. The Eschatology made some advance, but remained very imperfect. "The early Greek recked little of the life to come. For him, death was the end-all of human joys and sorrows." This assertion is immediately qualified by the remark that a dull, dreary consciousness was experienced by all alike in Hades. An addition came to Delphic cult from a cult with which it got intermingled, namely, that of Dionysus, the object of the Orphic mysteries. "Chastisements and recompenses entered into the Delphic theology."

Father Dempsey evidently considers that the decisive instance is the knowledge shown of what Cræsus was doing in Lydia at the moment when the oracle was delivered at Delphi. We may grant the authenticity of the oracle and yet deny a supernatural explanation. It was the business of the authorities at Delphi to know the condition of things, not only in Greece, but also in the countries which came into relations with her. This knowledge they must have obtained by the employment of secret agents in the great cities. It is possible that the strange act by which Cræsus endeavoured to puzzle the oracle may have been suggested to him by one of his courtiers or dependents, whether Lydian or Greek, who was the Delphian agent at Sardis; that he let Delphi hear of his design; and that Delphi took the chance that Cræsus would accept his suggestion. There is also the possibility that the bearers of the roll were tampered with, and that the lines which Cræsus read were not written at Delphi, but at some place between Delphi and Sardis, to which the agent had sent a letter from the Court of Cræsus. It is notable that the oracle of Dodona, which had as good a claim to inspiration as its rival of Delphi, but seems to have taken no pains to maintain a secret service, was unable to tell Cræsus that he was boiling a tortoise and a lamb. If the late Mr. Maskelyne had been a contemporary resident in Dodona, probably some of the Lydian gold would have been diverted from Delphi to the more ancient oracle of Zeus.

Father Dempsey shows the saving wisdom to follow the example of a master whom he often quotes, Dr. L. R. Farnell. Both these investigators are large in their admissions of uncertain results. Therein they are a strong contrast to the typical rationalist, who glories in upsetting Christian rites by identifying them with pagan institutions on the ground of the poorest and most superficial simili-

tude. Rationalists often seem absolutely incapable to appreciate how substantials differ from outer and accidental circumstances. Hence their asserted identities are enough to make the hair stand on end, especially in view of the extreme smugness, self-contentedness and contempt for better minds which mark the rationalist propaganda in its mischievous work at the present day. Another example lies in the fact that while for large minds the problem of moral evil in the world, and especially in the State and the Church, has throughout ages produced a sense of personal incompetence to judge, for the narrow mind of the rationalist the case is easy and cocksurely decisive against theistic religion. They leave the evil unbalanced by the good. Their nose is for garbage amid healthy meats, and they reject the sound as identical with the corrupt.

Miss Jane Harrison notes that there exists a document of quite singular interest, no less a thing than an official statement from the mouth of the local priestess of the various divinities worshipped at Delphi, and—a matter of supreme importance—the traditional order of their succession. Delphi was the acknowledged religious centre of Greece, and nowhere else have we anything at all comparable in definiteness to this statement. Thrice familiar though the passage is, it has not, I think, been quite fully understood. It must therefore be examined somewhat in detail. The prologue of the *Eumenides* spoken by the priestess of Apollo opens thus:

First in my prayer before all other gods
I call on Earth, primæval prophetess.
Next Themis on her mother's mantic throne
Sat, so men say. Third by unforced consent
Another Titan, daughter, too, of earth,
Phoibe possessed it. She for birthday gift
Gave it to Phoibos, and he took her name.

* * * * *

With divination Zeus inspired his soul,
And stablished him as seer, the fourth in time,
But Loxias speaks the mind of Zeus his sire.²⁰

Such are the opening words of the prologue to the *Eumenides*, and they are more truly of prologue character than perhaps at first appears. They set forth or rather conceal the real *agon* of the play, the conflict between the new order and the old, the daimones of Earth, the Erinyes, and the *theoi* of Olympos, Apollo and his father Zeus, and further necessarily and inherently the conflict of the two social orders of which these daimones and *theoi* are in part the projections—matriarchy or, as it is better called, the matrilinear sys-

²⁰ *Æsch. Eum.* 1-8 and 17-19.

tem and patriarchy. Even so late as the second century A. D., Pausanias could cite but a single evidence of the bribery of the Delphic oracle in the whole of its history. And indeed, a people to whom belief in the sanctity of oracles was almost the only article of faith, any attempt to tamper with the voice of God would have appeared sacrilegious to the point of impossibility, so that no motive existed for dishonesty upon the part of the interpreters of an oracle.

CLAUDE C. H. WILLIAMSON.

THE CATHOLIC APOLOGIST

I

ON REASONING

IN REASONING we always proceed from the evident to the less evident, from the known to the unknown. We reason by the comparison of two things with a third, thus inferring their agreement or disagreement one with another. Just as in mathematical reasoning we set out with the principle, "things that are equal to the same thing are equal to one another": so, in metaphysical reasoning, we set out with the principle, "things that agree with the same thing agree with one another." Its converse, of course, follows, "when of two things one agrees and the other disagrees with a third thing they disagree with one another."

Thus we construct the syllogism, for example:

All men are mortal;
All soldiers are men;
All soldiers are mortal.

It will be seen here that we have two terms, "soldiers" and "mortal," which we compare with a third term, "men." We find that "mortal" agrees with all "men," that "men" agrees with all "soldiers," and that therefore "mortal" agrees with all "soldiers." $A = B, B = C, \therefore A = C$.

In this case "men" is the term of comparison or, as it is called, the middle term, i. e., the term forming the medium of comparison for the other two terms.

The two first propositions in which comparison is made with the middle term are called the premisses, the third proposition in which inference is drawn from this comparison is called the conclusion. The middle term never enters into the conclusion, it has served its purpose and is thrown out.

That premiss which contains the term of wider extension is called the major premiss, that which contains the term of lesser extension is called the minor premiss. Thus, "mortal" extends to a greater number of subjects than either "men" or "soldiers"; "All men are mortal" is, therefore, the major premiss, "All soldiers are men" is the minor premiss, "All soldiers are mortal" is the conclusion.

An argument which fills a lengthy book can on inspection be reduced to these simple proportions. For example, a socialist writes a bulky volume in defense of his pet theory, the whole may be reduced to this simple syllogism:

Whatsoever is detrimental to social welfare should be abolished;

Private ownership is detrimental to social welfare;

Private ownership should be abolished.

Since few will quarrel with his major premiss, his whole work will be a laboured treatise endeavouring to establish his minor premiss. His opponent will try to show that there is no necessary connection between private ownership and the social evils they both deplore, but that these originate from other causes.

Bearing in mind these simple elements of argumentation, it will be noted that the premisses are the cause of the conclusion, nor can they effect what is beyond their powers of causation. They will only generate the conclusion which is contained in them. You cannot therefore draw a conclusion which is beside your premisses, thus you cannot argue:

Cruelty cannot be from God;

Nature is cruel;

Therefore there is no God.

The only possible conclusion that could be drawn from these premisses is: Therefore nature is not the handiwork of God. A theist will, of course, dispute the minor premiss.

Neither may you extend the conclusion to wider limits than the premisses warrant: thus if one argues:

True religion promotes virtue;

Some Catholics are not virtuous;

Therefore Catholicism is not true religion,

the conclusion goes wide of the premisses, the most they will justify his concluding is that some Catholics do not act up to the dictates of true religion, he cannot infer that the whole Catholic religion is false: one might point the same argument with equal facility and equal imbecility against any religious system whatsoever.

Further, you must not infer a contradiction where none exists; for instance, because the Ceremonies of the Mass are not commanded in the New Testament, it does not follow that therefore they are forbidden. This is the fallacy named in the "ignoring the point in dispute."

Again, the arguent must not assume in either of his premisses what he has got to prove, thus :

Nothing that cannot happen ever has happened ;
Miracles cannot happen ;
Therefore miracles have never happened,

this is a mere begging of the question at issue. Watch then the scope and drift of your opponent's argument.

It will be observed, furthermore, that the middle term or term of comparison is the hinge of the whole argument. It is not always easy in a lengthy piece of reasoning to pick out the middle term. Make sure you have a clear conception of your adversary's middle term and then examine it carefully, ten to one the fallacy will be here. If it is ambiguous you have in reality two terms of comparison instead of one; for example, "worship" is ambiguous, it may mean the worship of *latria* or it may mean the worship of *dulia*. "Mediator" is ambiguous, it may mean mediator of redemption or it may mean mediator of intercession. Sometimes ambiguity arises from the fallacy of the accent: accentuate "Roman" in the term "Roman Catholic" and it implies that there are other Catholics besides Roman Catholics; accentuate instead "Catholic" and it implies that all true Catholics are in communion with the See of Rome: here we have two totally distinct conceptions expressed by the same term, with only a slight difference of accent.

Again, the middle term must in one or other premiss be extended to its full extent, being distributed over everything that the term can cover, otherwise you have the fallacy of the undistributed middle term, which is sometimes very tricky; thus at first sight this sounds all right:

All soldiers are men;

The origin of the following chapters is a series of lectures delivered by me to a congregation of soldiers at Mustapha Barracks, Alexandria. It is at their request that I have prepared them for publication. My object has been to give to the averagely well educated Catholic layman, a clear and, as far as possible, simple exposition of the reasoned basis upon which our Holy Faith rests. That he may be able to give a helping hand to that numerous and increasing band of earnest souls, who, dissatisfied with the presentment of Christianity offered to them, are casting around for a firmer foothold.

Some men are bad tempered ;
Some soldiers are bad tempered.

As a matter of fact it is altogether faulty, the middle term is no-

where distributed, it has been split in half and stands for two distinct classes of men; i. e., soldiers and civilians; you have not got one term of comparison but two: put something else in the place of "bad tempered" and you will see the fallacy at once; thus:

All soldiers are men;
Some men are civilians;
Some soldiers are civilians,

with an identically similar argument you conclude a contradiction in terms.

Pay great attention, then, to your opponent's middle term: remembering that he cannot make up his middle term to suit himself, if we allow him this license he can prove anything and everything; no! he can only use that middle term which nature or revelation provides him with. His middle term must not be ambiguous, and it must be distributed.

Let me address to the CATHOLIC APOLOGIST one or two practical remarks:

Never be afraid of an antagonist, you occupy an impregnable position, which he can never carry by assault.

Never lose your head or your temper, nothing whatever is gained by it, it only engenders rash statements and confused reasoning.

Be in no hurry, there is always plenty of time: it is a compliment to your opponent to tell him his difficulty requires thinking over and that you will answer him when you have given it careful consideration.

Insist that your opponent be quite clear as to his meaning, that you may not be arguing at cross-purposes.

Keep him to the point: his constant endeavour will be to side-track you. Take up a side-issue but do not allow yourself to be entangled in it. Always bring him back again to the main argument.

Finally, do not lose patience with him: you can show that your position is reasonable and you can clear up difficulties; but you cannot give faith, that belongs to the operation of the Holy Ghost: therefore let earnest prayer always go with your argument, and so you will advance the Kingdom of God.

II

THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

There are two great fundamental truths, the basis of all religion whatsoever. They are: The existence of a Supreme Being, Creator and Ruler of things: and the Spiritual and Immortal Nature of the human soul created by Him. These two truths are not only

matters of faith, they are also pervious to reason. Nor is there anything inconvenient in our knowing the same truth both by reason and faith, for reason and faith are different lights, the one natural and the other supernatural; just as in natural sciences we may come to the knowledge of the same truth by two different methods, inference or experiment. Reason and faith are both lights of the intellect, bearing sometimes upon the same object, but the latter is higher, more clear, more sure, and more satisfying than the former. Reason is the handmaid of faith, the steps leading up to the throne. It is with the reasonable basis of faith with which we have to do at present. We will therefore proceed to the consideration of the first great truth; i. e., the Existence of God.

There are two main arguments whereby we prove the Existence of God, the first is as follows: We start with the principle that there must be a sufficient reason for the existence of everything that exists. This is incontrovertible; to whatsoever I turn my attention I immediately perceive that there must be a sufficient reason for its existence; the table upon which I write exists; I find a sufficient reason for its existence in the intention, design and skill of the carpenter who made it from the raw material of rough timber. Now, the sufficient reason for the existence of anything must be sought either in itself, that is to say, it is self-existent, its very nature is to exist, it is in itself a sufficient reason for its own existence; or else its sufficient reason for existence comes from without, it has a received existence bestowed upon it by a superior agent, it is caused. Now, as I look around me on the universe in which I dwell I perceive nothing that is a sufficient reason for its own existence, for all things are subject to flux, motion and change. They are constantly changing; they are made and they wear out; they come into being, run their course and then cease to be. Something outside themselves has caused them. If I were a sufficient reason for my own existence I should always have been and I should always be; it would be my very nature to exist. I should be eternal, having no beginning and no end. This is obviously not the case in anything of which we have cognizance. All things have some cause. Now, we cannot carry this chain of causes back into the infinite. We must come to some starting-point. In other words, we are forced to acknowledge a Self-existent Being, One Whose Nature is to Be, a Cause of causes, Self-existent, Motionless, Eternal, from Whom all inferior existences emanate, the Creator of all things, God.

Our second argument presupposes the former. In addition, we postulate that the effect is contained in its cause, the cause must

be proportioned to the effect which it produces, or in other words, that no cause can produce an effect above its powers of causation. This is quite evident; if, for example, you went into your sitting-room and there saw a scuttle full of coals placed upon the table, and if, on inquiry, you were told that the baby put it there, you would know quite well that the muscular power in a baby's arms is a cause totally out of proportion with the effect produced.

Very well! When you see a photographic camera, a telescope, or a microscope, there is not the faintest doubt in your mind that nothing but intelligence of a high order could have designed such a wonderful instrument. Yet we owe these machines entirely to the study of the eye, by which men have discovered and learned to apply the laws of optics, and so have been enabled to make all optical instruments. Can any reasonable being deny intelligence to the Maker of the eye, when he is forced to concede it to the copyist who made the camera?

Take the human body as a whole, it is an inconceivably perfect and intricate machine. It matters not at all how it was formed, whether by evolution or otherwise, the fact remains that nothing but infinite Intelligence could have produced it.

Take again the huge instruments you see in our ships, in our factories and so forth, nothing is clearer than that they are the outcome of intelligence. But what are they in comparison with the starry firmament? Its unimaginable size, the unthinkable forces within it. All governed by the most far-reaching, yet minute and intricate laws. Atheists are constantly talking about the laws of nature, the admirable designs of nature. But it is utterly impossible that you should have law without a law-giver, design without a designer. The whole universe cries aloud that there must be a Being of infinite power and intelligence Who made it all.

Again, you have only to look around you to see that in the world there are multitudes of persons and that they are endowed with intelligence. An impersonal and non-intelligent first cause could not possibly have produced personality and intelligence, for the effect would exceed the cause which produced it. We are obliged therefore to concede as first cause of all things a personal and intelligent Deity, Who, having no models outside Himself, has fashioned all things that are, upon the likeness of the perfections which He perceives in Himself.

The arguments from contingent existence to Necessary Existence, and from observed effects to the First Cause from whence they emanate are the two main arguments for the Existence of God.

It will be noticed that they remain as they have always been, unanswered and unanswerable.

There are those who deny the relations between cause and effect. They are scarcely to be taken seriously; but if they prefer some other terms we will not quarrel over names. I therefore purposely laid down as my first principle that "for everything that exists there must be a sufficient reason for its existence"; a principle which it is not possible for anyone to deny. Nothing whatsoever can alter the fact that things which come and go, which are subject to motion and change are not a sufficient reason for their own existence. Nor will anything ever alter the fact that perfections found in the things produced must per-exist in the First Cause Which produced them.

Atheists do not attack these main arguments, they shelve them. For the most part they raise difficulties on side-issues dealing not with the existence but with the providence of God. They will argue from the suffering and evil, the apparent injustices and inequalities which we see around us, that there cannot be a Supreme Controller of the universe, or these things would not happen. You will, for example, hear people say with reference to the great and devastating war through which we have just passed: how can there be a God? The reader will recollect that, in the beginning, when speaking about reason, I pointed out that premisses can only generate a conclusion which is contained in them. Now, these and such-like premisses do not even touch the existence of God, they refer only to His providence. If they were cogent they would prove that God is not good and not just, but they would not prove that He is non-existent. They do not even so much as touch the question of His existence. No one will, however, consider them cogent unless he is convinced that his own intelligence has embraced the entire scheme of the universe in the past, the present and the future, that he knows all the causes of things, and all compensations and adjustments. A claim which even the vainest will hardly make.

We ourselves are continually acting under laws vast and far-reaching which we instinctively recognize without comprehending. The determinist will argue theoretically against the freedom of the will; yet he will congratulate himself upon, or poignantly regret, past actions, precisely because nothing can rob him of the intimate conviction that he might have done otherwise. Whatever his theories may be, in his every action and in all the relations of life he acts upon the assumption of free-will, neither could he do otherwise did he try ever so hard. We proclaim in words that it is unjust that the innocent should suffer for or with the guilty. Yet we

ourselves are at times prepared to accept vicarious sufferings as atonement. Or again, in punishing the guilty we almost invariably inflict suffering upon some who are innocent, without our sense of justice being outraged thereby, simply because we instinctively recognise, though we do not comprehend, that great law which accounts for so much that is otherwise inexplicable, namely, the solidarity of families and nations and of the whole human race.

Let not the finite set itself up as the measure of the Infinite, if it would avoid being absurd. Arguments which merely show that the Mind of God is greater than the mind of man, will never prove the Deity non-existent. What the Atheist must do is to show that nothingness can produce existence, design exist without a designer and law without a lawgiver; when he can do that he will be worth listening to; till then his arguments are valueless, being altogether beside the mark.

(To be continued)

REV. P. M. NORTHCOTE.

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE TRAGIC EMOTIONS

IN THE world of philosophy and literature, Aristotle has come to be regarded as one of those foundation stones upon which all sound principles and sane ideas of taste and criticism must rest for their initial strength and validity. Save for a few Moderns of the so-called School of the Inductive Method in literary criticism, who would fain throw aside entirely the conservative fetters of authority, and judge purely by intrinsic and subjective standards of taste, the world to-day is just as prone to recognize the potent sway of the Peripatetic Philosopher as it was in the Golden Age of Grecian learning. In the *Poetics*, Aristotle has sounded the very depths and has established solid and lasting principles of artistic taste, so that his pronouncements, like those of some ancient oracle, have been received by the world at large as well nigh infallible; yet at the same time their meaning has been interpreted and misinterpreted, expounded and beclouded, and adapted to suit the standards and temperaments of this and that school of thought, till one almost wonders if they ever were intended to convey any objective truth at all. Containing a life time's food for thought, the *Poetics* must be studied and pondered over, subjected to the most minute philosophical criticism, and read in the light of Aristotle's other works; for not otherwise can a true comprehension of the hidden meanings of some of its passages be obtained. And it is just in this regard that many critics have gone astray. Any work of Aristotle must be studied in the spirit of his entire philosophic system, in order to understand his terminology and to expand into many ideas what is often contained in a word.

Such is the limited extent of this essay that it will be impossible to treat in an exhaustive manner even one topic of the *Poetics*; and as the topic in question has been the subject of so much discussion already, it seems vain indeed to attempt to throw any further light upon it. The object, therefore, will be simply to essay a further development of some of the theories already advanced with reference to the tragic emotions and their catharsis; and in the endeavor to subject these emotions to a searching psychological analysis, it is to be hoped that a logical, satisfying explanation of the tragic emotions and their characteristically pleasurable effects will result.

That we may begin with a clear notion of the tragic emotions,

pity and fear, we must first of all define what is meant by a passion, of which emotion is a type. A passion, derived from the Greek word, to suffer, is primarily a bodily affection; but it is likewise predicated of the soul's analogous movements. In all men there is what is called a sensitive appetency, an organic faculty that we have in common with animals by which we tend to what is good and pleasing and shrink from the opposite. Man, however, having a will and intellect may see a good in an apparent evil and thus be attracted to what would repulse a brute beast. Thus suffering may become for man a good, a thing of beauty; as for example, the suffering of a martyr.

It is customary to divide the passions into two classes according to their objects, namely, the concupiscible and the irascible passions. We might delay at length on the nature of these two divisions; but as the treatise would necessarily involve an understanding of Scholastic terminology, unfamiliar to many readers, we shall but mention them in order to place the passions of pity and fear in their proper category. The *concupiscible* appetite is a tendency towards something that really is or appears to be a good for our nature. We want that something in order to possess it; thus we love, we desire, we take pleasure in an object. Now it is the same appetency that makes us shrink from what appears to be or really is evil; and so we hate, we shrink away, or we are sad because of some displeasing object. Pity, a form of sadness, whereby we view some other's sadness as our own, is therefore classified as a concupiscible passion.

When something that is either desired or avoided has an aspect of difficulty, that is, when the object must be conquered, then the *irascible* appetite comes into action. There is an appearance of arduous good to be attained or arduous evil to be avoided when we hope or despair, or when our courage is aroused, or again when we fear or become angered. And so fear is a feeling awakened by threatened evil, viewed as more or less avoidable.

Emotion, as has been said, is a type of passion. It is the name given to intensified passion. "Emotion takes effect as a flood which bursts its dam; passion as a stream which wears for itself an ever-deepening channel." We, therefor classify pity as a concupiscible emotion, and fear as an irascible emotion. Now comes the difficulty: how can these two apparently opposite tendencies—sorrow-begetting tendencies—blend into a distinctive pleasurable result,—the so-called tragic emotions? This will be answered in the process of the discussion. Also, some critics are concerned greatly regarding the nature of the appeal to the passions, questioning whether the tragedy, as such, may not be divorced from the idea of morality.

In other words, may not artistic tragedy deal with matter that appeals to the emotions in an immoral way?

To this last, it must be answered that the passions are necessarily involved in the question of morality. For unless they are subservient to the higher powers, *i. e.*, conformable to right reason, they tend to draw the will to take pleasure in what is merely a good to the senses, which at times may be a positive evil to the higher rational good. And so there can be no question of separating tragedy from morality. Its appeal must ever be up-lifting, morally good, and conformable to right reason. True, the aim is not primarily moral, but rather to give pleasure; but this pleasure depends not on any subjective norm, but upon the sound judgment of a cultured man of highest principles. So we may say that morality enters into the tragic appeal, inasmuch as it is inseparably involved in the æsthetic ideal.

What is the æsthetic ideal of tragedy? The answer to this question necessitates a brief synopsis of Aristotle's theory of art. Art, according to Aristotle, is an imitation of nature, its object is to produce an emotional delight, a pure and elevated pleasure, such as would appeal to an ideal spectator. This particular species of pleasure arises from the imitative quality in art; for art is essentially an imitation. "A work of art," says Aristotle, "is a likeness or reproduction of an original, and not a symbolic representation of it . . . it produces its original, not as it is in itself, but as it appears to the senses." Herein lies the formal object of art—idealization or artistic universalization. Things as they are outside the mind are said to be natural. Now the artist, looking upon the natural object, idealizes and universalizes it in his mind, *i. e.*, he omits this detail, emphasizes another and brings out the essential notes in bolder relief; he expands, generalizes, in a word, gives his idea a completer form; the poet through the medium of language, the musician through harmonious sound, the painter by colors and the brush, the sculptor by lines and form; and the result is a work, rivaling nature, and in a certain sense completing nature. It is the copy of a copy—nature twice removed. The end of this whole process is to give pleasure by administering to man's love of beauty through an appeal to pleasurable emotions; and that in an active sense to the artist himself, and in a passive sense to the spectator. Pleasure of this kind is as old as man. In the very earliest times we have records of various kinds of mimicry, such as crude drawings, songs and chants, fantastic and symbolic dances, etc.; all of which are but different forms of the inherent impulse to imitate nature. How naturally a child takes to "make-beliefs." The young boy will spend hours, playing soldier, cowboy,

or Indian; while the little girl delights in nothing better than to "play house," and to pretend that she is a mother to her dolls. In fact, our first impulse as infants is to imitate, and it is by this process that we learn to walk, to talk, and gradually to form those habits which will later fit us for our sphere in life. "Now art is for a mature society, an elevated form of play, a highly-regulated employment of leisure activities; it is an outlet for an imperious impulse—that of emotional self-expression, an instinct which compels us to seek relief under the stimulus of pent-up feeling."

There is this to be remarked about all works of art: the appeal to the emotions must be impersonal and freed from narrowing details, that is, they must not represent anything that tends to make a spectator suffer repugnance or pain. For example, the pleasures of taste and smell cannot be included among the fine arts, because their employment serves too personal and practical an end. Not even the pleasure of a lover could be called an artistic emotion; it being too really felt, too personal, and quite distinct from the disinterested quality of the emotion experienced in witnessing a drama, like "Romeo and Juliet." To exemplify what is meant by an impersonal emotion, let us imagine that a friend in actual life was really suffering the trials of Hamlet. How differently, how infinitely more would we *feel* for that friend than we do feel for the Hamlet of the stage, who arouses our pity and fear, but only through the artistic medium of the imaginative faculty.

So much for the appeal to the artistic emotions in general. Now we shall investigate the functions of tragedy, examining in detail the emotions it arouses; and thus attempt to explain how, through these, a specific kind of pleasure is effected.

Aristotle has defined tragedy thus: "Tragedy is an imitation of an action that is serious, complete and of a certain magnitude; in language embellished with each kind of artistic ornament, the several kinds being found in the separate parts of the play; in the form of action, not of narration; *through pity and fear* effecting the proper *catharsis*, or purgation of these emotions." The last part of this definition is our chief concern, but it would be well, however, to cast a brief glance upon the whole definition, that we may observe its bearing upon the question of the emotions.

The generic note of tragedy is imitation; it is differentiated from comedy as being an imitation of a serious action and not of a trivial or ludicrous incident. The pleasurable accessories referred to are rhythm, harmony and song, these being embellishments that go to increase the pleasure, distinctive of tragedy, but which are by no means essential to it; and the whole combination of effects is to

be worked into the tragedy in a dramatic and not in a narrative form. In all, six elements go to make up the constituents of a tragedy—spectacle—the stage appearance and costume; melody, *i. e.*, choral songs; diction; character—the distinctive qualities of heart, portrayed in the personages; intellect, or the morals and thought expressed; and finally the plot, which according to Aristotle is the chief element, the expression of the fundamental note of tragedy, *viz.*, action.

“Through pity and fear, effecting the proper catharsis of these emotions.” Here is the great question which has vexed some of the most notable literary critics for centuries—What did Aristotle mean by the “catharsis” of tragedy, and how is it produced by the excitation of the emotions of pity and fear? Had he completed his work on Poetry, undoubtedly he would have removed all cause for dispute; but as it is, we are left to judge from his use of the term in other contexts, as to whether it should be interpreted as a physiological metaphor, in the sense of “purging” or “clearing away”; or as a metaphor from the religious rite of lustration, in the sense of “purification.”

The latter interpretation seemed to prevail among the older critics; and even in comparatively modern times, the distinguished names of Milton and Lessing gain for it a certain vogue. Catharsis is supposed to be a term borrowed from the religious rite of purification whereby the hand or the soul was cleansed from some taint of sin or corruption. Thus the passions, being impure by excess, are purified by the tragic excitation. Just what this element of impurity is, and how the purification is wrought, are questions hard to determine satisfactorily. According to Milton and Lessing, tragedy is a purification of the passions in as much as by the tragic excitation, the passions are weakened and subdued. Again others claim that the lessons and examples have a moderating effect upon pity and fear, inherent to a disquieting degree in all men. Thirdly, the tragic pity and fear are called “pure” because they arise through the imagination and contain no element of real pain. Akin to this explanation is that of Brandes, who regards the tragic emotions as pure because they are of a disinterested, impersonal character. And finally there is the opinion that tragedy elevates pity and fear to the sublime, thereby rendering them pure.

The primary defect of the purification theory is that a moral purpose is read into the scope of the tragedy; and as we have already seen, Aristotle held that the end of art was not to teach a lesson, unless perhaps in a secondary and accidental manner, but rather to afford an emotional delight. Moreover, it is hard to

understand why the continuous excitation of a passion would tend to subdue its vehemence. On the contrary, just the opposite would seem to be the natural result, namely, the strengthening of the passion into a habit, since habit is the outcome of frequently repeated acts. But each individual need only consult his own experience, to discover that the predominant effect of tragedy is an emotion of pleasure and relief, and that it is this effect, and not a moral one, that prompts him to patronize the drama.

The pathological interpretation of the catharsis is unquestionably more in keeping with Aristotle's mind, especially when his position is understood. Before Aristotle wrote, Plato had disparaged the tragedy, which, he claimed, appealed chiefly to two of the inferior elements of the soul, our faculty for grief and our faculty for laughter; and the effect produced was to the detriment of the soul, serving to enervate and eventually to nullify the control of reason. To justify the tragedy in opposition to such an authority as Plato, Aristotle was forced to give an entirely different *raison d'être* for the drama. He therefore placed the tragedy in another category—its purpose is not moral in scope, but to produce an elevated and ennobling pleasure through the exercise of man's natural faculties. The pleasure is that which naturally follows upon the relief of pent-up energy, or the purgation of troublesome matter in the human organism. Alone capable of being produced by the exercise of strong and serious emotion, the legitimacy of this particular kind of pleasure is to be judged by its result, namely, a harmless relief of passion, present to a disquieting degree in the soul, and the healthful exercise of natural activities.

To confirm our opinion of Aristotle's real meaning in the use of the word "catharsis," we shall quote a passage from his *Politics*, where the term is explicitly employed as a medical metaphor, in contradistinction to a moral signification. He is speaking of the effect of music upon the soul, and what he says of music, likewise can be applied to the drama. "We approve," he says, "the general division of music into moral, practical, and rapturous; according as it is fitted to regulate our affections, to excite us to action or to inspire us with enthusiasm. Experience proves that different melodies and rhythms are respectively adapted to these different purposes; so that as moral strains are to be employed for mental discipline and liberal pleasure, the enthusiastic and sometimes the practical may be listened to for the purpose of what, by a natural metaphor is called *purgation*, which shall be more fully explained in our treatise on Poetry (this treatise was never completed). Let it suffice at present to observe that these passions (such is the

unison of minds) by which one person is strongly affected, are felt in a certain degree by all around him, and therefore, when skillfully expressed by the musician, they will be powerfully communicated, especially to those who by their natural constitution, are peculiarly exposed to their influence; and whose extreme sensibility will thus be *excited* and *agitated*, and thereby purified and refined, and (just as melancholy is purged by tears) disturbed and lightened with a pleasurable relief. Thus it is that at the celebration of the Orgic rites, enthusiasm vents itself and evaporates in those sacred melodies, during the performance of which the mind undergoes a kind of purgation, and is thereby cured of its frenzy. The same thing happens in all violent affections, whose excesses cure themselves; and in proportion as the preceding agitation has been the greater, the subsequent relief proves the more delightful." *Politics* Book V., Ch. 7.

But lest suspicion should arise that Aristotle would allow any sort of pleasure resulting from the relief of emotion by the catharsis as legitimate, his ideas with reference to the proper pleasure must not be overlooked. In the tenth book of the "*Ethics*," he writes: "Our nature prompts us to pursue pleasure and flee from pain. Pleasure is moral when our love and hatred, our grief and our joy are respectively excited by natural and worthy causes. . . . As to gross and reproachable pleasures, the very name of pleasure may with propriety be denied them, since they are acknowledged as such only by people of corrupt minds and perverse sentiments. Persons diseased are not fit judges of the relish of wholesome food; nor is that white, which appears such to those afflicted with color-blindness. Pleasure is not desirable unless it proceeds from an honorable, at least an innocent source."

In all the various commentaries on the *Poetics*, much is said about the pleasure, distinctive of tragedy; and different explanations are ventured as to the way that this is brought about. All lead up to a certain point, but just at that particular place where one would like to enquire for further enlightenment, a disappointing halt comes into the explanation. How can the exercise of pity and fear cause pleasure? Certainly in themselves they are sorrowful passions, and oftentimes their excitation brings anything but delight. Are they separately stimulated by the tragedy, or are they blended; and if so, how can this be, since one is a concupiscible passion and the other an irascible passion; one caused by a present evil, the other by a future impending evil, difficult to avoid?

A proper understanding of the Scholastic theory of pleasure should solve the chief difficulties, and at the same time shed light

upon the true meaning of the catharsis. Pleasure arises from and is the positive concomitant of the free and vigorous exercise of some vital energy. Everyone, for example, has experienced the exhilarating effect of a brisk walk after long confinement at some sedentary employment. The athlete can tell us of that restful sensation which follows upon strenuous exertion in the field of sport. Again, observe an infant; how it will laugh and yell with delight, as it kicks its feet and works every muscle of its little frame, and if prevented from venting its energy in any other way, will take to crying and thus exercise its lungs and voice. But muscular activity is not the only kind that affords delight. To each faculty, whether sensuous or intellectual, belongs an appropriate pleasure. Vision, hearing, and the activity of the other senses, are all productive of agreeable feeling, but still more so is intellectual speculation. Each faculty is wonderfully constructed by nature for some special activity, and in the prosecution of its end, the will sees a good and takes complacency in the accomplished function, with the result that a pleasurable emotion is experienced. In direct proportion as the faculty is the better adapted to function, and the object which forms the stimulus more perfect, the keener will be the resulting pleasure. "Pleasure accompanies every act of perception by sense in a higher or lower degree in proportion as the perceiving power is more or less properly constituted and the perceptible object is fair and good. Should the perceiving power be perfect and the object the best on which that specific act of perception can possibly be exercised, the pleasure would be highest in degree. The same applies to every act of reasoning and intelligence." *Artist Ethics*, Book X.

Now the nature and quality of pleasure will depend upon the nature and quality of the activity. The pleasures of sight differ in purity from those of the palate and of the touch; while the pleasures of the intellect, being distinctive of man, are by far the noblest and purest. Sense activity may give the *intensest* pleasure, because man is more easily attracted by what is tangible; but they never can be *appreciatively* enjoyed in the same measure as the delights of intellectual processes. When, however, there is a harmony of operation between bodily and rational faculties with concomitant concordant pleasure—emotions, the resulting pleasure is the greatest possible, both in an intensive and in an appreciative sense. For in this case spontaneous activity facilitates the mental powers, and with the increased ease and rapidity comes an augmentation of pleasure. Tragedy, for this reason, affords the greatest of all artistic pleasure. In the tragedy more faculties are brought into play, and hence

more activity is required; the faculties of both body and soul are exercised harmoniously upon a pure and ennobling object; and moreover, variety, another extremely important ingredient of pleasure, is present constantly to prevent the decay of vital force, concomitant upon the incessant action of the highly wrought faculties. Thus the tragic drama especially exercises both the sight and hearing in a most energetic manner; besides, the object itself is a living thing; the imagination is affected by the strongest and most serious emotions, those of pity and fear; the intellect is offered ample food for thought by the plot, characterization and sentiments; while the will is kept in constant activity in the direction of this complexus of faculty operations. The scope of the catharsis, due as it is to pleasurable emotions resulting from the activity of the faculties, is practically unlimited in the case of the tragedy.

From this theory of pleasure, it follows that there is a catharsis in all art, differing specifically according to the emotions called forth. And therefore music has its own proper catharsis; and likewise poetry and painting, sculpture and architecture; for all appeal to the emotions and effect a purgation of those particular ones that are the objects of the several arts. Tragedy is only particularly singled out for its cathartic effect, because—to give a probable explanation—its emotional appeal is more intense and emphatic.

A special difficulty here presents itself. How explain the process by which self-regarding emotions are made to bring about an artistic emancipation from narrowing and painful detail, which naturally tend to mar artistic pleasure? It cannot be said that pity and fear are elevated to artistic emotions by becoming wholly impersonal and altogether objective, since no matter what change is wrought by idealization, the essence of the emotions cannot change. Pity and fear are essentially self-regarding emotions. In the case of pity, the difficulty is easy to solve; the personal character of the emotion is founded upon benevolence. Fear, however, is more difficult to explain, because it is so essentially a *personal* dread of impending evil. If this note be done away with, some other emotion may be present, but it will not be *fear*. Idealization must effect some other change.

Not a little discussion has been caused by the words used by Aristotle to denote the characteristics necessary to the tragic hero, in order that he may excite the proper emotions. To arouse our pity, the hero must be *deserving* of our regard; and to 'cause us to fear for him, he should be a man like *ourselves*. The analysis of tragic pity and fear will show clearly how aptly

and significantly these terms have been chosen, and will exemplify as well as the personal character of the emotions.

"Pity is a particular phase of sadness, adding to sadness a certain accidental difference." Sadness, it will be remembered, arises from the presence of an unavoidable evil. Now if another's unavoidable evil be considered as *one's own*, pity will result. It is therefore primarily a self-regarding emotion—an apparent contradiction, it would seem, since pity is commonly regarded as the most altruistic of the emotions. True, it is based upon love of another; but all love arises from love of self. There are two kinds of love, a love of *desire*, when we love a person or thing on account of some advantage accruing to ourselves; and a love of *friendship*, when we love an object for its own sake. Such a love is that of a mother for her child. But even this has its root in self love, for as Aristotle says: "things appertaining to others—that is, to friendship—are grounded on that which pertains to love of one's self" (Ethics IX.).

What is said of this love of benevolence can be said, likewise, of pity. Pity is based on self love; it is benevolence towards those in sorrow, and its root is in a likeness to ourselves. "Pity," writes Aquinas, "is compassion for the misery of another, and arises from the fact that we are pained or sorrowful at another's pain. But inasmuch as a sorrow relates only to our good, so a man can be sorrowful at another's misery only insofar as he regards that other's misery as his own." The psychological foundation of this explanation rests upon the fact that there is in the will but one prime impulse, namely, love for our own good. Because, however, of our common human nature, by reason of which we are all able mentally to put another man in our own place and wish him good as we would wish it to ourselves, that other becomes an *alter ego*. Yet it should be remembered that that which benevolence loves in another must be something which a man esteems. Else the benevolent coward would love only cowards. This explains why Aristotle insists that the hero of a tragedy should be a man *deserving* of our pity.

So far we have been considering the *personal* character of pity. But what about fear? "Fear," according to Aristotle, "arises from the impression of an impending evil, which is destructive or painful." The imminence of the evil is essential to fear, as may be seen from this definition. Likewise the impending evil must be felt *personally* in some way or other; otherwise there can be no fear. For not even death is feared when vaguely imagined; it is only when it comes near us, when at least we imagine it is really

approaching, that we are filled with dread. And so it is that the tragedy must accomplish more than Sir Philip Sidney demands who describes its effect in these words: "The high and excellent Tragedy . . . that with stirring the effects of admiration and commiseration, teacheth the uncertainty of the world." As if anyone was ever moved to strong emotion by such a platitude! No—fear is not caused save by an imminent evil, felt after some manner as personal; and just as with pity, if I fear for another, this fear can only arise from having identified myself with that other.

How, then, may these emotions, so essentially personal, be made the foundation of artistic pleasure? There seems to be but one explanation; it rests upon the manner in which we identify ourselves with the actors of the tragedy. Our emotions are real and personal, inasmuch as we identify ourselves with the actors and feel their emotions as our own; but because we may at any time free ourselves from the thralldom of the imagination, and, by a reflex act, readjust ourselves to the true state of affairs, our emotions are said to be artistic.

Thus tragic fear is experienced when, carried out of ourselves by the vehement excitation of the sensitive appetite, caused by the tragic imitation of nature, we for the time identify ourselves with the actors in the apprehension of some terrible event. *We* become the actors, and the evil impends upon *us*. It is artistic emotion, however, because at any time we may stop and reflect, and thus recognizing the unreality of the fear, be freed from the disturbing and narrowing personal element. In witnessing the tragedy of Macbeth, for example, we are not overcome by any vague feeling of fear lest sometime the same fate may fall to our lot, nor by the impersonal platitude that "unrestrained ambition will bring upon us like disaster." There can be no more fear from such a source than from the thought of distant death. The horror, the dread, the agonizing sense of impending catastrophe can spring only from our imagined identification with the hero, who on account of his likeness to ourselves—and here can be seen the reason for Aristotle's use of the word—has become merged into our own individuality.

Each one may confirm this explanation from his own experience upon witnessing a tragedy. That the fear is real is beyond doubt. Else, how explain the tenseness of the whole body, and the feeling of excited suspense as the curtain falls upon a strong scene? But with the tenseness and suspense there comes a pleasure upon the realization that, after all, the emotion is only proceeding from the imagination, and that we are merely consenting to be deluded for the sake of the delight that the emotion causes in us by its excita-

tion of our sensitive and rational faculties. Tragic pity, too, is thus made easy to understand. For when we cease to fear for ourselves, we reflect how we should feel in like circumstances, were they actually ours; with the result that the persons of the drama immediately become the recipient of our full sympathy.

The tragedy, therefore, produces a blend of emotions of pity and fear, so intensely combined as to render any sharp line of demarcation well nigh impossible. They so gradually shade off into one another, that we are hardly able, even upon reflection, to perceive where one begins and the other ends. Yet, because they are different passions, pity being aroused by the presence in another of an evil, viewed as our own, while fear is caused by an evil difficult to avoid, impending upon ourselves, they cannot be identified, despite the fact that fear is always an ingredient of pity. All that can be said is that fear predominates when the stress of passion is at its height and when *unconsciously* we become identified with the personality of another; but when the passions, in quieter mood, allow us to project ourselves by a *conscious* act into another's position, pity then prevails. In both cases our own individuality becomes an alter ego; in one, unconscious self-allocation tends to make the fear actual and personal; in the other, conscious reflection objectivizes this fear, and excites the benevolent passion of pity.

The insistence upon the reflective process is not without reason, for therein lies the cause for distinction between artistic and inartistic emotion. Should the mind, upon reflection, perceive that the grounds for the emotional excitement are objective and actual, the artistic pleasure will be more or less blunted in proportion to the objectivity of the fundament. True artistic emotion, on the other hand, is the outcome of the mind's recognition of pure, imaginary excitation, *i. e.*, of artistic idealization. A good example of the former type is that which is aroused by the old-fashioned melodrama, filled to overflowing with all manner of hair-breadth escapes from death. The hero is seen *actually* suspended in mid-air from a wire; or again he is made to attempt some daring leap from a high precipice; he is rescued from the approach of a real steam engine that comes thundering upon the stage, etc. Now because there is always the possibility of actual danger in these incidents—as not infrequently proved to be the case, when the mechanism refused to operate properly, and the actor received injury—the fear experienced is not entirely imaginative. We truly dread the approach of actual danger. Therefore the melodrama cannot be said to appeal merely to the imagination, but much of its power

lies in the reality of its stage properties and spectacular mechanism.

What about the Shakespearean drama, where not unfrequently the spectacular element is introduced, such as duelling, bloodshed, battle scenes, etc.? Are these defective elements in our English drama? Yes, it must be admitted that by the introduction of such elements, some of the artistic pleasure undoubtedly is sacrificed for the sake of a thrill; for the imagination is thus given less scope for activity. It will be remembered that the Greek tragedy forbade even the death of an actor to be portrayed *coram populo*; from which it appears that the Greeks appreciated better than we the true aim of art.

Mr. Frederick Harrison, the well-known English literateur, has well characterized the weakness of the Shakespearean spectacle in contradistinction to the pure emotional appeal of the Greek tragedy: "Shakespeare is a genius," says he, "and a master in every human passion, but this versatility dulls the attention which should be fixed solely on the tragedy—*i. e.*, on the terrible and pitiable catastrophe. Comic and diverting scenes are said to be necessary to relieve the attention. They have a moral and melodramatic force, but they blunt our pity for the tragic end. Do we thrill with compassion as the dead lie about the stage in a heap? Hamlet is the most splendid form of romantic tragedy, but it is not pure and unrelieved tragedy. Relief from strain of emotion has the effect of sacrificing the *potent moral* effect of *intensive pity*—*i. e.*, of pure tragedy. What really is added to Macbeth and Othello by the comic scenes or riot and bloodshed?"

Having subjected the tragic emotions to a somewhat minute psychological analysis, it can be seen that their effect upon the rational and sensitive appetite is most natural, and, provided that their object be sound and healthful, altogether pleasurable and even necessary at times, serving as they do as an innocent outlet for man's unceasing desire for activity. That the Greeks were more susceptible to their influence than we of the present day can scarcely be denied—an admission, by no means, to our credit. Though we live in an age of tremendous activity, a time when the stage, the platform, the press, the art gallery, and even the school room make every use of the spectacular to command a sway over the senses and passions, the resulting effect tends but to our own detriment, in that the appeal lacks the intellectual and ennobling element. It is a sign of the times, that tragedy has gone out of vogue. Men crave an emotional appeal today as well as in the days of Pericles, but their tastes have been vitiated by the wrong food; and their minds, beclouded by the trivial and the ignoble, have lost a true

appreciation of one of the noblest and most beneficial of the arts, one that has administered for generations to man's natural craving for the good and beautiful.

In the mad rush for happiness, the modern world, wild with its hankerings for emotional delight, can well afford to listen to the sage and sober philosopher of antiquity, the great and noble Aristotle, who despite an environment of Paganism, yet recognizes the real reason for seeking a pleasurable relief of the emotions—the true aim of the tragic appeal. "Happiness," says the Philosopher, "is our final end—sought for its own sake, but happiness cannot consist in mere recreative pastimes; for it is absurd to think that all our serious exertions and strenuous labors should terminate in so frivolous an end. We do not labor that we may be idle, but we are idle that we may labor with more effect. The weakness of human nature requires frequent remissions of energy; but these rests are only the better to prepare us for enjoying the pleasures of activity. Happiness consists in virtuous energies."

The recreative pleasure, therefore, is but a means to better enable us to our final end; and it is evident to reason that the nobler and loftier the pleasure, the more apt it should prove towards furthering that end, which is the greatest good for our highest faculties; in a word, the enjoyment of the Summum Bonum—God Himself.

Manila.

HENRY LEE IRWIN, S. J.

IN NATURE'S REALM

THE FOLK-LORE OF THE ROSE AND THE OAK

"Great talk they make about the coming Rose,
The very fairest flower, they say, that blows!
Such scent she hath; her leaves are red, they say,
And fold her round in some divine, sweet way";

—Philip B. Marston

HAYS M. GUBERNATIS in his "Mythology of the Plants":
"Among the flowers the royal supremacy is generally accorded to the rose," a statement which poet and peasant alike will endorse. "The queen of flowers" has long been her royal title, except in Greece, where the rose was "the king of flowers":

"If Zeus chose us a King of the flowers in his mirth,
He would call to the rose, and would royally crown it;
For the rose, ho, the rose! is the grace of the earth,
Is the light of the plants that are growing upon it!
For the rose, ho, the rose! is the eye of the flowers,
Is the blush of the meadows that feel themselves fair—
Is the lightning of beauty, that strikes through the bowers,
On pale lovers that sit in the glow unawares.
Ho, the rose breathes of love! ho, the rose lifts the cup
To the red eyes of Cypris invoked for a guest!
Ho, the rose having curled its sweet leaves for the world
Takes delight in the motion its petals keep up,
As they laugh to the wind as it laughs from the west."

—Mrs. Browning

The flower has long been esteemed as queen of the floral world; Andreini, from whose "Adamo" Milton has been supposed to have borrowed the plot of "Paradise Lost," gives her the supremacy in the first Garden:

"Thou flower supremely blest,
And queen of all the flowers;
Thou form'st around my locks
A garland of such fragrance,
That up to heaven itself
Thy balmy sweets ascend."

Poetry is full of tributes to this queenly blossom; here is one by Sappho, the Greek poetess, who flourished about six hundred years B. C.; rather, two translations of her quatrain:

"Would Jove appoint some flower to reign
In matchless beauty on the plain,
The Rose, mankind will all agree,
The Rose the queen of flowers would be."

"If Jove would give the leafy bowers
A queen for all their world of flowers,
A rose would be the choice of Jove,
And blush the queen of every grove."

"The garden-star, the queen of May," Ben Jonson's shepherd terms the flower. The Greeks dedicated it to the rosy-fingered dawn goddess Aurora—"as if Aurora on its leaves had left her blushes with her tears," explains one poet, while another reasons:

"Did Dawn take from the Rose its vermeil hue,
Or did the new-born Day make blush the flower?
Each wears the beauty of the morning hour,
To each the ruddy tint and heavenly dew."

The Romans were extravagantly fond of roses, and, like the Greeks, expressed their love for the flower in many ways. Both nations were fond of chaplets of all kinds, for a variety of purposes, the rose as king of the flowers naturally ranking highest:

"O royal Rose! the Roman dress'd
His feast with thee; thy petals press'd
Augustan brows; thine odor fine,
Mix'd with the three-times-mingled wine
Lent the long Thracian draught its zest."

—Austin Dobson

Cicero reproached Verres with the extravagant luxury of making the tour of Sicily in a bower of roses, whilst his person was also decked and garlanded with them. The Greeks had quite a joke against the self-indulgent Sybarites, to the effect that when one of them complained that he had not slept all night because one of the rose-leaves upon which he slept had become folded under him into a hard lump!

"the soft Sybarite, who cried
Aloud because his feelings were too tender
To brook a ruffled rose-leaf by his side." —Byron

Our expression, "a bed of roses," has a historical basis, since both in Egypt and in India mattresses were made from them for the use of people of rank. As now, they were even in ancient times valued for decorations; it is reported that Cleopatra once spent the equivalent of £200 for the adornment of a room with roses for one night. In the apocryphal Book of Wisdom occurs a reference to the use of this flower by the Hebrews of Solomon's time: "Let us crown ourselves with rosebuds, before they are withered. Sappho crowns the Muses with roses, Horace repeatedly speaks of crowning the bowl with roses, both as libations and at feasts. On the other hand, Roman laws against the indiscriminate use of garlands were most rigorous, and the breach of them was severely punished; one

offender was imprisoned for sixteen years for using a chaplet of roses.

The rose was early dedicated to Venus, the goddess of love, and poets of all times have accordingly extolled its virtues as the flower of lovers:

"The rose is the sign of joy and love—
Young, blushing love in its earliest dawn."

—James G. Percival

"And Venus, in its fresh-blown leaves,
An emblem of herself perceives."

—Moore's translation of Anacreon's Ode LV.

"'Tis said the rose is Love's own flower,
Its blush so bright, its thorns so many;
And winter on its bloom has power,
But has not on its sweetness any."

—Thomas Love Peacock

So both Venus and her son Cupid are usually portrayed crowned with roses, and old Chaucer, fond of garlanding his own head with them, also bedecks Venus with a crown of the red and white blossoms:

"And also on her hedde parde
Her rosy garland white and red."

"And on hire hed, ful semely for to see,
A Rose-gerlond fresh and well-smelling."

In the north, the rose was considered the favorite blossom of Holda, also called Frau Rose and Mutter Rose. Quite naturally, therefore, the rose, both red and white, appears at an early period as an emblem of the Virgin. In Germany the Madonna is frequently called Marien-roschen, or Mary of the Roses. But though both the red and the white roses are emblems of Mary, there has quite appropriately been the tendency to associate the white rose with her fête days, while her more earthly connections are typified by the red flower.

May, the Madonna's month, is the rose-month in Italy. Every one has them in the oratory or on the table all the month through, and even the servants make it a matter of conscience to spend their money on them. Many flowers are dedicated to St. Mary Magdalen, among them

"the wanton Rose, agen
That blushes for Penitent Magdalen."

Her day falls on July 22, so the roses of summer are said to fade about the period of St. Mary Magdalen's Day. St. Cecilia, too, is honored with a miraculous crown of roses and lilies.

Perhaps the most intimate connection between the rose and the Virgin Mary is the devotion of the rosary, instituted by St. Dominic, in which the prayers are symbolized by the flowers; the name has reference to the term *rosa mystica*, by which the Virgin Mary is frequently designated in the prayers of the Church. One of the many beautiful rose-legends has reference to the saving grace of prayer:

"A servant had gathered much goods of his lord's, and on the way with them must pass through a wood in which thieves were awaiting them. When he entered the wood he remembered that he had not that day said Our Lady's Psalter; and, as he knelt to do so, the Virgin came and placed a garland on his head, then at each Ave she set a rose in the garland so that it grew so bright that all the wood shone thereof. He was ignorant of it, but the thieves saw the vision and allowed him to pass unharmed."

The legends of the rose are many. According to the Greek legend, the rose was originally white, till Cupid, dancing among the gods, upset a cup of nectar upon it, and it became red; another tradition derives red roses from the blood of Adonis, while the white ones are the tears Venus shed over him; another states that Venus, hurrying to the aid of the wounded Adonis, pierced her foot with a thorn, a white rose was growing close by and as the blood fell upon it the flower was reddened.

"'Tis said, as Cupid danced among
The gods, he down the nectar flung,
Which on the white rose being shed,
Made it forever after red." —Robert Herrick

"And roses, touch'd with blood since Adon bled,
From her fair color fill'd their lips with red." —Swinburne

"White as the native Rose before the change
Which Venus' blood did in her leaves impress." —Spenser

"As erst in Eden's blissful bowers
Young Eve surveyed her countless flowers,
An opening rose of purest white
She marked with eye that beamed delight.
Its leaves she kissed, and straight it drew
From beauty's lips the vermil hue." —Anonymous

Rapin has a different origin: "The rose was once Rhodanthe, a beautiful Greek maiden, with many suitors. Entering the temple with her parents and people one day, and being pursued by her suitors, the excitement so enhanced her beauty that the people

shouted, 'Let Rhodanthe be a goddess, and let the image of Diana give place to her!' Rhodanthe being raised upon the altar, Phoebus, Diana's brother, was so incensed at the insult that he turned his rays against the new-made goddess. Then it soon repented Rhodanthe of her divinity, for her feet became fixed to the altar as roots, and the hands she stretched out became branches, her fingers turned to clutching thorns, and her too-ardent lovers into vines, drones and butterflies."

According to Mandeville, the red rose is said to have sprung from the brands lighted at Bethlehem to burn to death a holy maiden who had been wrongfully accused of some crime, but who, in her hour of anguish, prayed to God that He would help her. The fire was miraculously quenched, and the embers sprouted into red roses, while white ones blossomed from the unkindled brands.

"The stake

Branches and buds, and spreading its green leaves,
Embowers and canopies the fair maid,
Who there stands glorified; and roses then
First seen on earth since Paradise was lost,
Profusely blossom round her, white and red,
In all their variety of hues."

—Robert Southey

There are two versions of the origin of the moss rose. An angel, runs one, came down to earth in mortal guise. He was grieved at what he saw of the sin and misery of man, and sought a place of repose. Every place was closed against him, so

"The spirit, dejected sat beneath
The shade of a rose, whose fragrant breath
Lull'd him in slumber mild.
The evening dew as it fell around,
Left not a trace on the saintly ground,
Where, wrapp'd in the folds of a sleep profound,
Lay the fair and heavenly child.

"The morning sun broke the angel's trance,
And he said, as he turn'd a grateful glance
On the sweet and lovely rose—
'Thou hast yielded the shelter that man denied,
In the vain conceit of his stubborn pride,
A proof of my love with thee abide,
And nurture thine own repose.'

"And the green moss gather'd around the stem,
While the dewdrops shone like a diadem,
Crowning the blushing flow'r,
That now the wrath of the wind defies,

Exultant looks to the fostering skies,
And shielded thus in its brilliant dyes,
Gives signs of an angel's power!"

The other is the more familiar version, by the German poet Krummacher:

"The angel of the flowers one day
Beneath a rose-tree sleeping lay—
That spirit to whose charge 'tis given
To bathe young buds in dews of heaven.
Awaking from his light repose,
The angel whispered to the rose:
'O fondest object of my care,
Still fairest found, where all are fair;
For the sweet shade thou giv'st to me
Ask what thou wilt, 'tis granted thee.'
'Then,' said the rose, with deepened glow,
'On me another grace bestow.'
The spirit paused, in silent thought,
What grace was there the flower had not?
'Twas but a moment—o'er the rose
A veil of moss the angel throws,
And, robed in nature's simplest weed,
Could there a flower that rose exceed?

In eastern countries, and Persia in particular, the rose is a very lovely and highly celebrated flower:

"Where the light wings of Zephyr, oppress'd with perfume,
Wax faint o'er the gardens of Gul in her bloom." —Byron

"Who has not heard of the Vale of Cashmere,

With its roses the brightest that earth ever gave?" —Moore
Gulistan—"garden of roses"—is the work of the most famous of Persian poets, Sadi; the story runs that Sadi, a slave, had long been promised his freedom. One day Sadi approached his master with a rose in his hand, saying, "Do good to thy servant whilst thou hast the power, for time is fleeting and the season of power is often as transient as the duration of this flower. Do not longer delay the fulfillment of thy promise, my master." These words secured Sadi his immediate liberty, partly perhaps because he had made this generally favorite blossom plead his cause:

"Each morn a thousand roses brings, you say;
Yes, but where leaves the rose of yesterday?" —Waller

"Gather ye rosebuds while ye may,
Old Time is still a-flying." —Herrick

All the time the rose gardens are in bloom, Persia keeps the Feast of Roses:

"And all is ecstasy, for now
The valley holds its Feast of Roses;
That joyous time, when pleasures pour
Profusely round, and in their shower
Hearts open, like the season's rose."

Persian poets are fond of associating the rose with the nightingale, or bulbul, as they call the bird. According to their traditions, the bird utters a plaintive cry whenever the flower is gathered. In spring, it will hover around the bushes until overpowered by the sweetness of the blossoms, it falls senseless to the ground. The rose is supposed to burst from the bud at the opening song of its lover the nightingale. Another proof of the close association of the Venus of flowers with the Apollo of birds is the saying that among the many fragrant and beautiful flowers of earth, this one alone satisfies the nightingale. This love between the queen of flowers and the minstrel of birds is the subject of many poetical lines:

"The rose has flushed red, the bud has burst,
And drunk with joy is the nightingale." —Hafiz

"The rose, her poet nightingale, the songs from his throat that rise."
—Rumi

"The bulbul wail'd, 'Oh, rose, all night I sing,
And thou, beloved, utterest not one thing.'
'Dear bird,' she answered, 'scent and blossoming
Are music of my song without a sound.'"
—Edwin Arnold

"There's a bower of roses by Bendemeer's stream,
And the nightingale sings round it all the day long!
In the time of my childhood 'twas like a sweet dream
To sit in the roses and hear the bird's song." —Moore

"Though rich the spot
With every flower this earth has got,
What is it to the nightingale
If there his darling rose is not?" —Moore

India furnishes this tradition of the discovery of the valued attar of roses: To please the king Jehanghir, his favorite sultana caused the pool in the palace garden to be filled with rose water. The sun caused the oily particles to rise to the surface, an attendant, skimming the "corrupt" pool, found that the globules which burst open gave off a delightful odor, and so this fragrant oil of rose water began to be manufactured.

The origin of the word rose is debated. The Latin *rosa*, according to Dr. Prior, "appears to be a foreign word introduced to replace a more ancient name for the shrub *rubus*, which like the Greek root *rhodos* is expressive of a red color." But Professor Müller traces *rhodos* to a similar Aryan word which originally meant a sprig, a flower, a wort. In this case rose would indeed be *the* flower of all flowers.

The blossom speaks a varied tongue in the language of flowers, though in the main it is the emblem of true affection. Berkeley, in his "Utopia," describes lovers as declaring their passion by presenting to the favored one with a rosebud just opening; if the lady accepted and wore the bud, she was next given a half-blown rose, when she finally consented to wear a full-blown blossom it was the important question "popped and answered." Certain varieties of roses have been given rather artificial meanings, others seem rather senseless. Some of the more natural expressions are

Yellow rose—jealousy, or even a decrease of love.

White rosebud—girlhood.

Withered white rose, an emblem of what is transient and fleeting; it may even speak of "transient impressions," and so be rather uncomplimentary.

In North Europe folk-lore, the rose was under the special protection of dwarfs and elves, who were ruled by the mighty king Laurin, the lord of the rose-garden. This in turn gave it magical powers of divination. In Thuringia, therefore, a maiden forecasts the name of her future husband by naming several rose-leaves, tossing them into water, and watching them gradually sink; the last one to go down will bear her own future name. A rose-apple, worn over the heart, will keep a lover true, while the moss-rose, culled on Midsummer Eve with certain formalities, will surely wax prophetic:

"The moss-rose that, at fall of dew,
Ere eve its duskier curtain drew,
Was freshly gathered from its stem,
She values as the ruby gem;
And, guarded from the piercing air,
With all an anxious lover's care,
She bids it, for her shepherd's sake,
Awake the new year's frolic wake;
When faded, in its altered hue
She reads—the rustic is untrue!
But if its leaves the crimson paint,
Her sick'ning hopes no longer faint;
The rose upon her bosom worn,
She greets him at the peep of morn.

—("The Cottage Girl")

Quite appropriately, roses have long been used as bridal wreaths. Both Greeks and Romans set special value on the rose as a funeral flower; many left directions in their wills that their graves be planted with this favorite flower. In Wales white roses denote the graves of young maidens, while in many places it is the custom to plant a red rosebush at the head of the grave of a deceased lover.

"From the spot

Where the sweet maiden, in her blossoming years
Cut off, was laid with streaming eyes, and hands

That trembled as they placed her there, the rose
Sprung modest, on bowed stalk, and better spoke
Her graces, than the proudest monument." —Bryant

"And sweetly by that rose is typified
Her loveliness and spotless purity;
And the green myrtle, waving by its side,
Her certain hope of immortality." —Mantell

In the well-known story of Tristram and Ysonde we have a reference to the old belief that the departing soul takes up its residence in some plant, the rose being a popular one: "From his grave there grew an eglantine which twined about the statue of Ysonde, a marvel for all men to see; and though three times they cut it down, it grew again and ever wound its arms about the image of the fair Ysonde." Then there is the famous Scottish ballad of "Fair Margaret and Sweet William"; also the lines of Omar Khayyam.

"Out of her breast there sprang a rose,
And out of his a briar,
They grew till they grew unto the church top,
And there they tied in a true lovers' knot."

"I sometimes think that never blooms so red
The rose as where some buried Cæsar bled."
—Omar Khayyam

Among the Greeks, a rose-bush on a grave augured the happiness of the departed, and, according to Anacreon, the rose was supposed to have special virtue for the dead:

"When pain afflicts and sickness grieves,
Its juice the drooping heart relieves,
And after death its odors shed
A pleasing fragrance o'er the dead."

In folk-medicine, presumably on the doctrine of signatures which connects the color of red roses and blood, there are some curious treatments. For instance, one wishing rosy cheeks should bury a drop of his blood under a rose-bush; a more pleasant remedy is to rub the cheeks with the bright petals. As a charm against hemorrhage of every kind, the red rose should be gathered with the words: "Abek, Wabek, Tabek; in Christ's garden stand three red roses—one for the good God, one for God's blood, the third for the angel Gabriel; blood, I pray you, cease to flow." Or this version: "On our Lord Jesus' grave spring three roses—the first is Hope, the second Patience, the third God's Will; blood, I pray you, be still!" No doubt these have origin in the old tradition that the crown of

thorns was composed of the rose briar, and that the drops of blood that fell from Christ's head blossomed into roses in His path and about the cross.

In Italy, the red rose was formerly regarded as the emblem of early death; to dream of withered roses denotes misfortune, but the red rose in a dream indicates success in love. If a white rose-bush should unexpectedly bloom, it is taken by many as a sign of death in the nearest house. Many people in Germany believe that whoever throws a rose into a grave will waste away; others regard with alarm the mere fall of a rose from the hand. It is also very unlucky for a rose to shed its petals, as an illustration take the case of Miss Ray, who was murdered at the entrance to Covent Garden Theatre:

"When the carriage was announced and she was adjusting her dress, Mrs. Lewis happened to make some remark on a beautiful rose which Miss Ray wore. Just as the words were uttered, the rose fell to the ground. She immediately stooped to regain it, but as she picked it up the red leaves scattered themselves on the carpet, and the stalk alone remained in her hand. The poor girl, who had been depressed in spirits before, was evidently affected by this incident, and said, in a slightly faltering voice, 'I trust I am not to consider this as an evil omen.' But soon rallying, she expressed to Mrs. Lewis, in a cheerful tone, the hope that they would meet again after the theatre—a hope, alas, which it was decreed should not be realized."

Among the various ceremonies with which the rose is connected was the old custom of using it in paying rents for leased lands. For instance, Sir Christopher Hatton leased the greater part of Ely place for "a red rose, ten loads of hay and £10 per annum," though its owner reserved to himself and his successors the right of walking in the gardens and gathering twenty bushels of roses yearly.

Up to the end of the sixteenth century, there was a curious custom in France called the "*Baillée des Roses*," consisting of a tribute of roses paid by the children of the king, princes of the blood, dukes, Cardinals and other peers to the French parliament. It was rendered during the months of April, May and June, on days when sittings were held in the great hall. The peer whose turn it was to pay the tribute was called "*Rosier de la Cour*," must see to it that on that day all the rooms of the palace were decked with roses and other flowers. Before the sitting commenced it was his duty to go into every chamber with a large bowl of silver borne before him, in which were as many crowns of roses and bouquets as there were members of Parliament and officers attached to its service. The roses having been distributed to their rightful claimants, the peer

gave an entertainment to the presidents and councilors of the court. Its origin is not known.

Another French ceremonial is the yearly rose festival of Salency, instituted in the sixth century by a Bishop of Noyon, who was a native of the village of Salency. This festival was presided over by a rose queen, crowned with roses in acknowledgment of her being the most amiable, modest and dutiful maiden in the village. In many other places the name "Rosière" is given to the girl who gains the rose given as a prize for good conduct.

As a heraldic device, the rose has been popular. It is the floral emblem of England, perhaps in honor of the houses of Lancaster and York, whose respective badges were the red and the white rose. Shakespeare briefly sums up the history of the thirty years' War of the Roses in these lines from Henry VI.:

Plantagenet: Let him, that is a true-born gentleman,
And stands upon the honor of his birth,
If he suppose that I have pleaded truth,
From off this briar pluck a white rose with me.
Somerset: Let him that is no coward, nor no flatterer,
But dare maintain the party of the truth,
Pluck a red rose from off this thorn with me.
Warwick: And here I prophesy—this brawl to-day,
Grown to this faction in the Temple garden,
Shall send, between the red rose and the white,
Ten thousand souls to death and deadly night.

The estimate is a hundred thousand common soldiers, to say nothing of a large number of noblemen and eighty princes of the blood. Whether it was in the early days of the wars, or previously, these badges were adopted as emblems to be worn in the caps of the soldiers, is not clear, but there is a tradition that after the battle of Towton, a certain kind of wild rose sprang up in the field where the Yorkists and Lancastrians fell, and was to be found nowhere else.

"There still wild roses growing,
Frail tokens of the fray;
And the hedgerow green bears witness
Of Towton field that day."

Another legend states that at the time when the marriage of Henry VII. of the Lancastrian line to Elizabeth, heiress of the York claim to the throne, a rose with white and red flowers first blossomed, intimating the fact that the two opposing forces were now blended; this rose was named the York and Lancaster; it was originally a rose-bush growing in the garden of a certain monastery

in Wiltshire, which, during the War of the Roses, had borne at once both red and white roses. About the time of the marriage of Henry and Elizabeth, all its flowers blossomed forth with petals of red and white mixed in stripes; the wonder was hailed with joy as an omen of future peace and harmony.

The white rose was an emblem of the house of Stuart, and the tenth of June was long called White Rose Day, as the birthday of the pretender, the son of James II. and Mary. The Tudors, descended from Henry and Elizabeth, adopted the rose for their floral emblem; it appears everywhere in the art and architecture of that period, and also became the emblem of England. But long before England adopted it, the rose was carried on many a Roman shield as the badge of the warrior who carried the weapon.

Many are the proverbial sayings associated with the rose, most of them indicating what is sweet and lovely, bright and joyous—as soft as a rose-leaf, as sweet as a rose, rosy clouds, roseate hue, rose-colored glasses, rosy lips, rosy dawns—all imply that the red flowers were more highly prized and perhaps more common. As one writer states: "Poetry is lavish of roses; it heaps them into beds, weaves them into crowns, twines them into arbors, forges them into chains, adorns with them the goblet used in the festivals of Bacchus, plants them in the bosom of beauty. It not only delights to bring in the rose itself upon every occasion, but seizes each particular beauty it possesses as an object of comparison with the loveliest works of nature."

In Devonshire a blooming lass is said to look like a double rose; in the Swedish "*Frithiof's Saga*" is one instance of the rose used to represent what is fresh and youthful:

"He stands between the brothers there—
As though the ripe day stood
Atween young morning rosy fair,
And night within the wood."

As for the oft-repeated line from Shakespeare regarding a rose called by any other name, Mr. Hazlitt remarks that "although not originally proverbial, or in its nature, or even in the poet's intention, it has acquired that character by long custom." Here is a true and excellent proverb: "Truth and roses have thorns about them"; many poets have coined near-proverbs with the flower for comparison, of which these are a few:

"Love is like the roses,
Still its fragrance stays."

—Catherine G. Furley

"It never will rain roses ; when we want
To have more roses, we must plant more trees." —Eliot

"Sweet is the rose, but grows upon a brere." —Spenser

"When the stalk is snapt, the rose must bend." —Hartley Coleridge

By the way, the thorns of the eglantine, or sweet-brier rose, point downward because, so legend tells us, when the devil was excluded from heaven he tried to regain his lost position by means of a ladder composed of rose-thorns. But when the plant could only grow bush size, out of spite he placed its thorns in their present eccentric position.

Now for the expression, "Sub-rosa"—"under the rose," or "under the rose be it spoken." The usual explanation is being sacred to Venus the goddess of love, it naturally becomes the emblem of silence, since lovers do not generally want third parties included in their secrets. It has also been suggested that it symbolized silence because of man's inability to describe its charms. It was long a custom to have a rose carved in the ceiling of banquet halls, as a reminder that the conversation there carried on should not be repeated. Whenever a Roman, therefore, wished a certain matter kept secret, he added the significant words "sub rosa," and it became a sacred pledge between the few who had listened to him. "Silence forever wedded to her rose," is Browning's poetical expression of this adage.

In the language of flowers, the white rose has been considered the symbol of silence; in 1526 the emblem was placed over confessionals, to indicate that the strictest privacy veiled this solemn rite. The rose was early made an ecclesiastical emblem, and appears in both the art and the architecture of the Church, the rose window so common in cathedrals being one illustration. The northern portal of the cathedral at Upsala, Sweden, is covered with sculptured roses.

The cathedral of Hildesheim has a wild rose growing partially over it, whose roots are in the crypt; tradition says that it was growing on the spot before Charlemagne laid the foundations of the church, which makes it over a thousand years old. In short, roses always make appropriate church decorations, the queen of flowers being sacred to the Queen of Heaven. Some incline to the belief that the first rosaries were made of the smooth, glossy fruit of the plant, being chosen because of the associations of the flower with the Church; another theory is that the beads were once made of rose-leaves tightly pressed into round balls. But whatever the origin of the name, in the rosary is embodied the idea that prayer

arises to the Father of all like sweet incense from the heart of the flower.

THE OAK

In his poem, "The Growth of the Legend," Lowell states that "the pine is the mother of legends," and explains that the nations which have grown up within the mystical shade of this tree have a highly developed gift for legend-making and legend-telling. The same may with equal claims be said of the oak, within whose fostering shades grew up so many Grecian and Druidical myths. "The mythic oaks," Mrs. Browning terms them, and rightly, since they are true witnesses of old times departed, these venerable monarchs of the forest, "green-robed senators of mighty woods," as Keats fondly names them.

The groves were man's first temples, Bryant tells us, and either as direct objects of worship, or as forming the temple under whose solemn shadows other and remoter deities might be adored, trees have long been revered by man:

"In such green palaces the first kings reigned,
Slept in their shade, and angels entertain'd,
With such old counselors they did advise,
And, by frequenting sacred groves, grew wise."

The descent of man from a tree was a belief once received as a solemn fact and is a popular tradition of many different races the world over. In Greece the oak was the tree credited with this distinction, according to poetry as well as legend:

"These woods were first the seat of sylvan powers,
Of nymphs and fauns, and savage men who took
Their birth from trunks of trees and stubborn oaks."

—Virgil

"For when the world was new, the race that broke
Unfathered from the soil or opening oak
Lived most unlike the men of later times."

—Juvenal

So, in the "Odyssey," when the disguised hero is asked to give his pedigree, his questioner puts it in this wise: "For belike you are not come of the oak told of in old times, nor of the rock." If, in the times the "Odyssey" was written, in the ages it was supposed to take place, this tree-ancestry was already a legend of "old times," how very old it must be!

The oak has many attributes that would make it a favorite tree-parent for mankind. As Eliza Cook says, it is "the king of the woods, a brave rare tree"; it has sturdy, masculine virtues of which

a descendant would be proud to boast, and which the poet has long celebrated in such lines as:

"The oak, for grandeur, strength, and noble size,
Excels all trees that in the forest grow."

"Lord of the woods, the long-surviving oak." —Cowper

"Theirs is the nature that achieves,
No yielding there is found;
The very rustle of their leaves
Assumes a martial sound."

—Hugh Kelso

"And dark between shows the oak's proud breast,
Like a chieftain's frowning tower."

—Scott

"The monarch oak, the patriot of the trees,
Shoots rising up, and spreads by slow degrees;
Three centuries he grows, and three he stays,
Supreme in state, and in three more decays." —Dryden

Surely the oak is a forefather to be vaunty over! According to Ovid (Dryden's translation), when Jupiter wished to reward the hospitable old couple, Philemon and Baucis, for their kind treatment of him when he visited their home in disguise, Philemon was changed into "a spreading oak," Baucis into a linden:

"Then, when their hour was come, while they relate
These past adventures at the temple gate,
Old Baucis is by old Philemon seen
Sprouting with sudden leaves of sprightly green,
Old Baucis look'd where old Philemon stood,
And saw his lengthened arms a sprouting wood;
New roots their fasten'd feet begin to bind,
Their bodies stiffen in a rising rind;
Then, ere the bark above their shoulders grew,
They give and take at once their last adieu;
At once farewell, O faithful spouse, they said;
At once the encroaching rinds their closing lips invade;
Even yet, an ancient Tyanæan shows
A spreading oak, that near a linden grows;
The neighborhood confirm the prodigy,
Grave men, not vain of tongue, or like to lie.
I saw myself the garlands on their boughs,
And tablets hung for gifts of granted vows."

From the time of this celebrated transformation down to the present, it has been easy for mankind to humanize the oak, the sturdy stubbornness with which he faces the storm, his up-standing youth and his defiant old age, his jovial laughter as the wind left only one branch remaining for more to sprout upon. One fell

roars through his branches, his quick response to the light fingers of spring. Is it any wonder primitive man paid veneration to such a specimen as Shakespeare describes?

“an old oak, whose boughs were moss'd with age,
And high top bald with dry antiquity.”

The oak was the particular tree of Jove, or Zeus, and the grove at Dodona was a shrine where his will could be learned in the rustling of the leaves and the babbling of the brook that flowed close beside “the fair Dodonian tree,” as Spencer terms it. Romulus is said to have hung the arms and weapons of Acron, King of Cenina, upon an oak tree held sacred by the people, which became the site of the famous temple of Jupiter at Rome.

The peoples of northern Europe believed that the oak was sacred to Thor, the thunder-god; that it originated from his lightning bolts—all acorns to the contrary. It was considered an act of sacrilege to mutilate a sacred oak in ever so small a degree; a law of the Ostrogoths stated that anybody might hew down what trees he pleased in the common wood, except oaks and hazels; these trees had peace, that is, they were not to be felled. That profanity of this kind was not treated with impunity was formerly fully believed, an illustration of which is given us by Aubrey, who says that “to cut oakwood is unfortunate.”

The Greeks believed that dryads and hamadryads had their existence so inextricably bound up in the life of some tree that “as this withers and dies, they themselves fall away and cease to be; any injury to bough or twig felt by them as a wound, and a wholesale hewing down puts an end to them at once, a cry of anguish escaping the unfortunate tree-fay when the cruel axe comes near. So in “Appollonius Rhodius,” one of the hamadryads implores a woodman to spare a tree to which her existence is attached:

“Loud through the air resounds the woodman's stroke,
When lo, a voice breaks from the groaning oak,
'Spare, spare my life, a trembling virgin spare,
Oh, listen to the hamadryad's prayer!
No longer let that fearful axe resound,
Preserve the tree to which my life is bound,
See from the bark my blood in torrents flows;
I faint, I sink, I perish, from your blows!’ ”

As proof of his statement that “to cut oakwood is unfortunate, old Aubrey cites the following examples: “There was at Norwood one oak that had mistletoe, a timber tree which was felled about 1657. Some persons cut this mistletoe for some apothecaries in London, and sold them a quantity for ten shillings each time, and lame shortly after; soon after each of the others lost an eye, and he

that felled the tree, though warned of these misfortunes of the other men, would adventure to do it, and shortly afterwards broke his leg. It was as if the Hamadryads had resolved to take an ample revenge for the injury done to their venerable and sacred oak.

"And I cannot omit taking notice of the great misfortune in the family of the Earl of Winchelsea, who at Eastwell, in Kent, felled down a most curious grove of oaks, near his own noble seat, and gave the first blow with his own hands. Shortly after his countess died in her bed suddenly, and his eldest son, the Lord Maidstone, was killed at sea by a cannon bullet."

No wonder, is it, that, as Sir John Lubbock tells us, even recently an oak copse at Lock Saint, in the Isle of Skye, was held so sacred that no persons would venture to cut the smallest branch from it.

This reverence for the oak explains the origin of the custom of planting the trees on the boundaries of lands, a survival of which still remains in the so-called gospel oaks of many of the English parishes. With Thor's oak near, our forefathers felt a sense of security which materially added to the peace and comfort of their daily life. There is many a legend on the continent attesting to the safety offered by its sheltering branches; indeed, so great are its virtues that, according to a Westphalian tradition, the Wandering Jew can only rest where he shall happen to find two oaks growing in the form of a cross.

One authority, as additional evidence of tree-worship among our ancestors, would derive the word *kirk*, now softened into *church*, from *quercus*, the Latin name of the oak, as the tree was held particularly sacred by the Druids, those early British and Celtic exponents of tree-worship.

Scandinavian mythology locates fairyland at the roots of the oak; in Germany the holes in its trunk are called the pathways of the elves. It is generally agreed that fairies are most likely to be found—when found at all—dancing around oaks; Shakespeare was well aware of this habit, as he deftly informs us in the "Merry Wives of Windsor." And there was need for the presence of the fairies in oak groves, since witches are also said to gather on the oak sward under the tree. Devil's oaks are also of frequent occurrence, one of them at Gotha being held in great regard; Herne's oak was of this type, as according to popular English tradition, Herne was an ancient keeper in Windsor Forest, where he walked at midnight around an old oak which bore his name. Shakespeare tells the story of this evil spirit, called Herne the Hunter, in his celebrated comedy.

"The fairies, from their nightly haunt,
 In copse or dell, or round the trunk revered
 Of Herne's moon-silvered oak, shall chase away
 Each fog, each blight, and dedicate to peace
 Thy classic shade."

It is said that the oak was the tree that furnished the wood for the cross, though it is not the only one legend so credits. A further legend informs us that when the Jews were in search of wood for the cross, every tree, with the exception of the oak, split itself to avoid being put to such infamous use. On this account, Grecian woodcutters avoid the oak, regarding it as an accursed tree.

In Westphalia, it is made such an intimate member of the family that upon the death of a relative a peasant will announce it to the nearest oak, repeating solemnly many times as if to impress the news upon the venerable tree-friend of the deceased: "The Master is dead."

Perhaps because of their veneration of the oak as an ancestral tree, perhaps because of its marked martial aspect, the Romans made the leaves, in a crown, the proper emblem of the patriot. Emerson uses the expression "patriot oak-leaf" in his verses to "May Day"; and Shakespeare quite appropriately refers to this custom in his drama of the great Roman patriot, Coriolanus: "To a cruel war I sent him; from whence he returned, his brows bound with oak." Hartley Coleridge mentions this same mark of honor, in passing:

"The oak, which Briton bards had sung beneath,
 And whence the Roman plucked his civic wreath."

Michael Drayton, so conversant with the hallowed customs of the ancients, gives us a rather different version of the meaning of the decoration:

"Most worthy of the oaken wreath
 The ancients him esteemed
 Some man of worth redeemed."
 Who, in a battle had from death

Which idea Lowell further embellishes in his lines:

"No, a wreath, twine a wreath, for the loyal and true
 Who, for sake of the many, dared stand with the few.
 Not of blood-spattered laurel for enemies braved,
 But of broad, peaceful oak-leaves for citizens saved."

Montesquieu remarked of the value the ancients set upon garlands of oak that "it was with two or three hundred crowns of oak that Rome conquered the world." But for all this, the leaves had

other uses than crowning returned soldiers; for the boughs were carried at Roman weddings.

England, too, has always loved the tree from earliest times. Keats mentions a place "where oaks, that erst the Druid knew, are growing," and, as Cowper admits in his poem to "The Yardley Oak":

"It seems idolatry with some excuse
Where our forefather Druids in their oaks
Imagined sanctity."

Take these two trees South describes in "Roderick, the Last of the Goths":

"Two stately oaks stood nigh, in the full growth
Of many a century. They had flourished there
Before the Gothic sword was felt in Spain;
And, when the ancient sceptre of the Goths
Was broken, there they flourished still. Their boughs,
Mingled on high and stretching wide around,
Formed a deep shade."

Is it any wonder such stately, long-lived beings should be famous in poetry and history? Some of the oaks now standing in England were old trees at the time of the conquest, and their remains are cherished with reverent care as long as they show any traces of vitality. Many have been named and are local, even national, landmarks:

"A mighty growth! The countryside
Lamented when the Giant died,
For England loves her trees;
What misty legends round him cling,
How lavishly he once could fling
His acorns to the breeze."

—Frederick Locker-Lampson

("The Old Oak Tree at Hatfield Broad Oak")

"This sole survivor of a race
Of giant oaks, where once the wood
Rang with the battle or the chase,
In stern and lonely grandeur stood."

—James Montgomery ("Lines on a Drawing of Yardley Oak")

"Oak of Guernica! Tree of holier power
Than that which in Dodona did enshrine
(So faith too fondly deemed) a voice divine
Heard from the depths of its aerial bower.

Stroke merciful and welcome would that be
Which should extend thy branches on the ground,
If nevermore within their shady round
Those lofty-minded lawgivers shall meet,
Peasant and lord, in their appointed seat,
Guardians of Biscay's ancient liberty."

—Wordsworth ("The Oak of Guernica")

Oak-Apple Day is observed in England on May 29th, the anniversary of the Restoration in 1660. It was formerly the custom for country boys to wear oak-apples or sprigs of oak, in allusion to Charles II.'s hiding in an oak tree to escape from Cromwell's troopers after the battle of Worcester. In some places it is called Oak and Nettle Day, as bunches of nettles may be carried by the wearers of the oak sprigs and used to lash those who do not wear them. This tree, in Staffordshire, was long known as the Royal Oak, in honor of the king, who remained hidden up among its branches a full twenty-four hours:

"Wherein the younger Charles abode
Till all the paths were dim,
And far below the Roundhead rode
And humm'd a surly hymn." —Tennyson

In our own country there is Eliot's Oak, to which Longfellow pays tribute:

"For underneath thy shade, in days remote,
Seated like Abraham at eventide
Beneath the oaks of Mamre, the unknown
Apostle of the Indians, Eliot, wrote
His Bible in a language that hath died
And is forgotten, save by thee alone."

Naturally, the oak has a prominent place in folk-sayings. Of the many omens regarding it, one states that the change of its leaves from their usual color gave more than once "fatal premonitions of coming misfortunes during the great civil wars," and Bacon mentions a tradition that "if the oak-apple, broken, be full of worms, it is a sign of a pestilent year."

Long famous for its supernatural strength and power, it was much used in folk-medicine. A German cure for ague is to walk around an oak and say:

"Good evening, thou good one old;
I bring thee the warm and the cold."

Similarly, in England, oak-trees planted at the junction of cross-roads were much resorted to by persons suffering from ague for the purpose of transferring to them the complaint. Sickly children were said to be cured by passing them through a split oak. A German remedy for the gout is to take hold of an oak, or of a young shoot already felled, and to repeat these words:

"Oak-shoot, I to thee complain,
All the torturing gout plagues me;
I cannot go for it,
Thou canst stand it.
The first bird that flies above thee,
To him give it in his flight,
Let him take it with him in the air."

There are numberless "oak proverbs." According to one, "You must look for grass on the top of the oak tree," the meaning being that the "grass seldom springs well before the oak begins to put forth." The man who abandons some good enterprise for a worthless or insignificant undertaking is said to "cut down an oak and plant a thistle," often varied to "cut down an oak and set up a strawberry."

The truth of the next adage needs no comment, "Usurers live by the fall of heirs, as swine by the droppings of acorns." Referring to its growth, we are told that "the willow will buy a horse before the oak will pay for a saddle," the allusion being to the different rates at which the two trees grow. That occasionally some trifling event may have the most momentous issues is exemplified by "The smallest axe may fell the largest oak," or "Little strokes fell great oaks," though, on the other hand, "An oak is not felled at one chop." Then, again, it is commonly said that "Oaks may fall when seeds brave the storm," while the humble find encouragement in the thought that "The greatest oaks have been little acorns."

To dream of an oak is a prophecy of long life; under certain circumstances it also foretells riches.

In weather lore the tree figures prominently in such folk-rhymes as:

"If the oak is out before the ash,
'Twill be a summer of wet and splash;
But if the ash is before the oak,
'Twill be a summer of fire and smoke."

Or briefly, "Oak, smoke; ash, quash." Sometimes the form is:

"If the oak's before the ash,
Then you'll only get a splash;
If the ash precedes the oak,
Then you may expect a soak."

As a guide to the agriculturist is this quaint rhyme:

"When the oak puts on his goslings gray,
'Tis time to sow barley night and day."

An idea the poet has not been slow to adopt, with variations of his own:

"'Twas just ere the old folks used to say,
'Now the oaks are turning gray,
'Tis time for the farmer to plant away.'"—Phœbe Cary
"Oak leaves are big as the mouse's ear,
So farmer, go plant." —John V. Cheney

"The oak leaves pricked like a squirrel's ear."
—Hamlin Garland

In the language of flowers, oak leaves stand for "bravery," while the tree itself represents "hospitality":

"Here as 'neath the oak I sit
Whisperings come out of it;
Summer fancies, half desires,
Breaths that fan forgotten fires."

—Cosmo Monkhouse
HARRIETTE WILBUR.

Duluth, Minn.

BOOK REVIEWS

"*Mysterium Fidei de Augustissimo Corporis et Sanguinis Christi, Sacrificio Atque Sacramento.*" Eludicationes L in Tres Libros Distinctae. Auctore Mauritio de la Taille, S. J., Nuper in Universitate Catholica Andegavensi, Nunc in Pontificia Universitate Gregoriana de Urbe, Sacrae Theologiae Lectore. Un volume in-4° grand-jésus, de xvi-686 pages à deux collones, sur papier Lafuma, avec photogravures hors texte. Net: 50 francs; franco: 55 francs, Gabriel Beauchesne, Editeur, Rue de Rennes, 117, à Paris.

Truly a monumental work. In fact, the first really great theological work on the Mass. Of course the subject has been treated learnedly, and more or less fully, in general works of theology; but the importance of the subject demanded something more than that, and it was impossible to do it justice in conjunction with all the other questions that must find place in a general course. In this imposing volume of 633 pages with their double columns, and attractive illustrations, the fifty theses into which the treatise is divided, have ample scope for full development with quotations at length from every approved source. Scripture and Tradition, Fathers and Doctors of the Church, theologians and ecclesiastical writers of every age, councils and liturgies—all combine to give us a wealth of material, that proves to us beyond the shadow of a doubt that the Last Supper and Calvary are one and the same sacrifice, that the Eucharist is a sacrament and that its reception is necessary to salvation. The treatment of the subject is masterly, and the Latin is so simple that even he who runs may read, without fatigue and without danger of going astray.

The material make-up of the volume is worthy of the subject, as far as may be. The paper, the type, the presswork, leave nothing to be desired.

The learned author was formerly professor of theology in the Catholic University of Angers, France. He served in the late war as chaplain of Canadian cavalry. The present work was almost completed before the war, but was not finished until peace was declared. Father de la Taille is now teaching theology in the Roman Pontifical Gregorian University.

He has reared a lasting monument to himself in this work, and at the same time he has made the world his debtor. As one reviewer has well said: "He has done his work so thoroughly that it need never be done again." This is praise indeed. To have treated so important a subject, about which there was much discussion and wide divergence of opinion, even in the Council of Trent, so well

and so thoroughly as to supply the needs of all future students, is to have accomplished something of the highest praise. It is indispensable to every theological library, Catholic or non-Catholic.

"The Boyhood Consciousness of Christ." A Critical Examination of Luke ii., 49. By Rev. P. J. Temple, S. T. L. 8vo., pp. 244. New York: The MacMillan Co.

"Ever since Christianity presented itself for acceptance by mankind, questions of Christology have held a foremost place in religious research and discussion, and necessarily so, since the nature and personality of the Author of a religion claiming to be œcumenical and exclusive compel the attentive study of men interested in religious thought and life. The present generation has not been an exception in regard to the importance attached to these fundamental questions. Rather, in this respect it has set a new high-water mark. For while the fifth century is generally regarded as the golden age of Christological controversy, yet, from the point of view of the number and variety of the scholars interested and of the individuality and diversity of the results reached, the last half century has had no parallel in the history of Christianity.

"In these questions of Christology the ultimate determinant, the final test to which every student must come, is Christ's own mind as expressed in His words and in His manner of acting; everything that He says or does, either directly or indirectly to reveal His self-consciousness is of the first importance; whatever be the method pursued in attempting the solution of a Christological problem one cannot evade the query, what did He say about Himself? Then closely connected with the question of His self-consciousness is that of its origin. When and how did it begin? Did He possess it from His earliest years? Or was there for Him as for every normal child, a gradual unfolding of reason and of the consciousness of His relation to God? Or was it only in mature manhood, when on the threshold of His public career, that the consciousness of His mission and all that it implied, flashed upon Him? Or was its coming rather like that of dawning day, at first dim, then growing gradually into fullness of light and culminating in the brilliant clarity of the noonday?

"These important questions constitute one of the most popular of modern problems of the life of Christ. Speaking generally in non-Catholic circles it is held that Jesus began His life 'ignorant of His nature and destiny, an unthinking infant'; that at a certain point, by no means agreed upon, His consciousness dawned upon Him, and that it was subject to growth and development. Many pages of

modern works are given over to the attempt to explain naturally the origin and to trace the development of Jesus' consciousness. The result has been a great diversity of opinion, as a glance at the chapter on modern views in this book will show. Failure to agree on so important a question, affecting as it does our conception of Him for the first thirty years of His life, should arouse grave concern, and any effort to eliminate diversity and establish truth cannot be altogether unwelcome.

"As in all questions of theological import, so regarding the present one, the final court of appeal is, for the Catholic, the authority of the Church. But there is nothing to prevent him any more than any other student from envisaging the consciousness of Christ as a scientific problem as well, to be treated according to the laws of historical criticism, and when approached, the solution is found to be along one path, the careful investigation of the historical evidence. But unfortunately we are confronted by the fact that the historical data for the problem are meagre, wherefore there is all the more necessity for exceptionally careful scrutiny.

"The canonical Gospels preserve only one saying of Christ outside His public ministry. The only occasion when Jesus breaks the silence of the first thirty years of His life is when in answer to His mother's question, why He had tarried in Jerusalem and caused His parents three days of anxiety and sorrow, he said: 'Why did you seek Me? Did you not know that in the things of My Father I must be?' This saying, of the twelfth year, in which His relation to God is expressed by the phrase, 'My Father,' is the all-important one for the problem of Jesus' consciousness. Views and theories must be based on it."

With this text the present work is concerned. In the First Section, the author treats of the Early Period of the History of the Question, and quotes the Greek and Latin Fathers together with other early texts. He also considers conflicting heretical opinions.

In the Second Section we pass on from the Fathers to the Rise of Modern Rationalism and Modern Views. In Section Third the text itself is considered—its trustworthiness and its historical background. Then we have Christ's consciousness as expressed in the text, and the consideration of the Messianic consciousness as included in Christ's first self-interpretation.

This is followed by a section treating of the First Recorded Words and the Immediate Context, and finally by a consideration of the Recorded Words and the Remote Context.

There is a very full bibliography and copious indexes, both Scriptural and general.

It is hardly necessary to add that the work is comprehensive and

complete. The outline which has been given shows that. It seems as superfluous to say that the work is well done. The evidence throughout of painstaking, intelligent research and clear judgment as to the value of authorities and quotations *in se* and comparatively, is most convincing. Indeed, it is hard to see what more could be added.

This learned work will take a permanent place in the field of Christology, and will claim the gratitude while it commands the respect of all Scriptural scholars and students.

"Christian Science and the Catholic Faith." Including a brief account of New Thought and Other Modern Mental Healing Movements. By A. M. Bellwald, S. M., S. T. L., Professor of Theology at the Marist College, Washington, D. C. 8vo., pp. 269. New York: The Macmillan Co.

Why deal once more with Christian Science? With so many works already on the market, why increase the output by another study on this much-debated subject? Christian Science will run its course, as other systems of thought, once much in evidence, have run theirs, and will not be materially influenced by the discussions to which it has given rise. Yet to discuss the subjects of the day is an intellectual need. The process of winnowing out truth from error must go on without interruption, the more so in this case, as Christian Science skims over many subjects of the very greatest importance, opening up to controversial minds fair vistas of debatable ground.

But why associate New Thought with its traditional foe? The answer is found in this treatise, which makes plain that, whatever minor differences there may be between these two organizations, their wider aims and common pursuits unite them in a clearly defined group, and blend them together naturally in a common discussion.

Mind healing is not exactly an American invention or monopoly. It is practically coeval and co-extensive with the human race. Yet in our own day and place it has taken on hues and shapes that differentiate it radically both from its remoter and its nearer ancestors, and it is assuming proportions that may yet put its European prototypes completely in the shade. In its American dress, it has crossed both the Atlantic and the Pacific, and is making a successful bid for world supremacy in its chosen field. Under these circumstances, an inquiry into its origin, the underlying principles and the methods of these movements, must prove of interest, even if from a religious point of view they are not of sufficient moment to claim attention.

Such an investigation is no longer a pioneer work. Many Protestant authors have turned their attention to this newer Protestantism. Not a few scent in this new gospel of health danger for what they are pleased to call orthodox Christianity; their works are polemical in character, and, on the whole, of little intrinsic worth. Others, not particularly interested in the

churches, have been attracted by the psychological problems which the real or pretended success of these mind healers have forced on their consideration. These, though pursuing strictly scientific methods of investigation, but too often mar their work by an ill-disguised hostility, or a studied indifference, to revealed religion, so that hardly any work of either class could be unreservedly recommended.

From the Catholic viewpoint, few of the publications that have appeared, valuable though they are in their own way, can be said to do justice to the subject. Probably the best of them are Father Lambert's "Christian Science Before the Bar of Reason," Father Thurston's "Christian Science," in "Lectures on Religion"; Luther Searle's "Truth About Christian Science," and Dr. Walsh's various works on psychotherapy. But none of these is exhaustive, nor do any of them pretend to be. Besides, the movement has been constantly developing and spreading.

The present book proposes, besides giving a short historical survey of mental healing, followed by a discussion of the causes that may serve to account for whatever success the movement has achieved; to discuss from the Catholic standpoint, more freely than has yet been done, its philosophical and religious presuppositions, implications and doctrinal statements.

This quotation from the preface of the work sets forth very clearly its intent, purpose, scope and method.

The first thought that suggests itself to the mind of any thinking man is, what a pity that this mass of unreasonable, unproven, illogical claims, combined with so much fraud and chicanry, should appeal to so many men, who turn their backs on pure revealed religion, and should require so much attention from the serious minded and the orthodox in order to prevent it from doing greater harm! One might be tempted to think that the whole system is so palpably worthless as to be unworthy of serious thought and refutation. But, unfortunately, experience teaches otherwise. The movement has reached such proportions now, that it must be met instead of being brushed aside, and the author of this work has met it and analyzed it fully.

It is certainly a great advantage to have at hand an authoritative treatise on a subject like this, to which the preacher and teacher can turn at any moment with the assurance that it will not fail him, but will answer all his needs. It is not likely that this work will have to be done again. Christian Science will run its course, like all the other isms, and truth will finally prevail. In the meantime, we must all be equipped and prepared to strike down the false and sustain the true.

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
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